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It is no small irony the climate change caused by the 
exploitation of natural resources, has exposed a wealth of these 
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resources in the Arctic, ripe for exploitation.1 As sea ice recedes, 
permafrost melts and shipping channels stay open longer, 
resources long considered too expensive to extract have become 
economically viable.2 This process is triggering an explosion of 
exploitation, throughout the Arctic generally and in Greenland 
specifically. While lucrative, this sudden rush for resources 
creates significant problems for Greenland’s indigenous peoples, 
regulators, and those corporate actors who seek to ensure 
positive economic results, while protecting human rights and 
complying with international standards.3 
For the more than one hundred extractive corporations that 
have already invested some 1.1 billion USD in onshore and 
offshore exploration in Greenland, the problems faced by 
indigenous people have had little impact on their business 
practices.4 However, in March 2013, these indigenous voices 
were suddenly heard loud and clear; Aleqa Hammond and the 
opposition Siumut Party, swept to a stunning victory on a 
platform of increased extractives royalty payments, greater 
oversight of extractive industry, and stronger participation of 
local communities in development planning and 
implementation.5 
                                                 
1 See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies, Human Rights and Arctic 
Resources, 15 SW. J. INT'L L. 251, 261 (2009); Torleiv Bilstad, Climate change 
and consequences for the Arctic, in ARCTIC OIL & GAS 47 (Auslag Mikkelsen 
& Oluf Langhelle eds., 2008); Cultural and Social Research in Greenland, 
Selected Essays, 1992-2010 361 (University of Greenland, 2011). 
2 See generally Bratspies, supra note 1, at 271. 
3 See YVON CSONKA & PETER SCHWEITZER, ARCTIC HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT: SOCIETIES AND CULTURES: CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE 
57 (2004). 
4 Companies spent roughly $100 million in 2012 on exploration on land, 
while off-shore exploration costs ran beyond $1 billion. Alistair Scrutton, 
Greenland Warns EU May Miss Out on Its Mineral Wealth, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/us-greenland-pm- 
idUSBRE92617I20130307 [hereinafter Scrutton]. 
5 See generally Jan M. Olsen, Mining proponents win Greenland election, 
AP (Mar. 13, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/mining-proponents-win-greenland-
election-085902372--finance.html; Alistair Scrutton, Voters Deliver Backlash 
Over Greenland's Minerals Rush, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/us-greenland-election-
idUSBRE92907F20130313 [hereinafter Voters Deliver Backlash]; Palash R. 
Ghosh, Greenland Election: Autonomy Comes At What Price?, IBTIMES.COM 
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 This victory may mark a sea change in Greenlandic 
extractive development, promising major changes to extractive 
industry regulation and practice in Greenland. As a result, 
extractive corporations in Greenland have entered an emergency 
holding pattern, as the long term effects of this sudden explosion 
of indigenous resistance to unfettered exploration and 
exploitation of Greenland’s tremendous natural resource wealth.6  
In Greenland, the primary driver of opposition to extractive 
industry has been the lack of consultation and control over 
development. In the words of newly victorious Prime Minister 
Aleqa Hammond “[t]he central issue here is who will run the 
country?”7 Speaking with reporters, she continued, “[p]eople feel 
that it is foreign companies who have too much say here."8 Other 
objections center on the threat of environmental degradation, 
which could impact culturally important indigenous uses of 
natural resources, as well as traditional “livelihoods.”9 All these 
concerns reflect specific indigenous rights which are guaranteed 
to Greenland’s indigenous population under the International 
Labor Organization Convention 169.10  
                                                                                                 
(Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/greenland-election-autonomy-comes-
what-price-1123789; Terry Macalister, Greenland Government Falls as Voters 
Send Warning to Mining Companies, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/15/greenland-government-oil-
mining-resources.  
6 Even before the election results were in, numerous businesses 
suspended operations in anticipation of an opposition victory. Voters Deliver 
Backlash, supra, note 5. “’Everything is on hold for us with the election,’ said 
Ib Laursen, operations manager at Greenland Minerals and Energy.” Alistair 
Scrutton, Mining, China Central Issues in Greenland Election, NBCNEWS (Mar. 
11, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/51140500/ns/business-stocks_and_ 
economy/t/mining-china-central-issues-greenland-election/#.Uiel4GQa-AM. 
7 Voters Deliver Backlash, supra note 5. 
8 Voters Deliver Backlash, supra note 5. 
9 See Ghosh, supra note 5; Alistair Scrutton, In Vote, Resource-rich 
Greenland Debates New Global Role, REUTERS (Mar. 10, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/10/us-greenland-election-
idUSBRE92907F20130310. 
10 See Ghosh, supra note 5; Macalister, supra note 5. Convention 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 
1989, I.L.O. No. 169, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 [hereinafter ILO 169]. Greenland 
acceded to ILO 169 when Denmark became a signatory state. While 
international law would appear to bind Greenland regardless, it has been made 
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This paper applies the rights-based approach to look 
critically at the human rights risk in Greenland within the context 
of the reality that human rights risks have already dealt a 
substantial blow to extractive industry in Greenland. Using the 
Right to Respect Framework and Guiding Principles developed 
by U.N. Special Representative John Ruggie specifically, the 
paper seeks to provide specific guidance to business enterprises 
entering the Greenlandic extractives market, on how to identify, 
prevent and mitigate human rights risk. 
The rights-based approach is an analytical technique that 
allows for a constructive, integrative, and inclusive discussion of 
issues that are marked by power imbalances and/or significant 
ontological differences between relevant parties.11 By applying 
this approach in Greenland, this paper seeks to bridge the divide 
between the indigenous rights and corporate perspectives, 
instead of forming a contentious and unproductive dichotomy 
between the two.12  
Part I of the paper provides a review of the current 
extractive industry development environment in Greenland 
touching on the legal and cultural realities that shape the 
operation of extractive industries in this Arctic nation. Part II 
discusses how the new R2R Framework and corresponding U.N. 
Guiding Principles can be applied to analyze human rights risks 
in Greenland and work towards managing the current wave of 
anti-extractive sentiment. Part III applies this framework to the 
Greenland, through the tool of human rights due diligence, in 
order to understand the rights environment and identify specific 
rights at risk. Part IV completes the application of the R2R 
Framework by identifying possible Policy Commitments that 
business enterprises should take in Greenland, to minimize their 
                                                                                                 
clear by Greenland that it considers itself to be bound to the Convention 
regardless. 
11 U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 
[hereinafter Guiding Principles]. 
12 “Indeed, such an approach is both efficient and equitable.”  A. Nigam 
& S. Resheed, Financing of Fresh Water for All: A rights Based Approach, 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/callaa/98-003.html. 
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human rights impact and lessen the resistance of Greenlanders to 
foreign investment in extractive industry.  
I. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND INDIGENOUS CULTURE IN 
GREENLAND 
 
A. Greenland; an Introduction 
 
1. Basic Information 
 
Greenland stands to be the country most affected, in relative 
terms, by the explosion of extractive industry development in the 
Arctic.13 With a current GDP of around 2 Billion (USD) and a 
population of less than 60,000 people, Greenland has a 
deceptively high GDP per capita.14 The reality is that 
Greenlanders face some of the highest prices for basic 
necessities in the world.15 They suffer poor, uneven economic 
development and unsustainable levels of government subsidy.16 
Furthermore, there are sharp distinctions between residents of 
towns and settlements, the latter averaging only 2/3 the income 
of the former.17 In such a small, economically marginalized 
country, the potential infusion of billions of dollars in extractive 
industry investment can and will create fundamental changes for 
Greenland and its majority indigenous population. Whether this 
                                                 
13 Any discussion of extractive industries, indigenous rights or economic 
development in Greenland must begin with a caveat that is more of a promise. 
Today, Greenland is an extraordinary, dynamic country, in which everything 
from law, to governance to climate and culture are in a state of flux. What is 
written here reflects the author’s fieldwork and desk review conducted between 
May and October of 2012 and should be read as such. There is a potential for 
significant changes in the regulatory framework during the fall sitting of the 
Parliament occurring immediately after the completion of this paper. 
14 See generally STATISTICS GREENLAND, GREENLAND IN FIGURES: 2012 
(David Michelsen ed., 9th ed. 2012) [hereinafter GREENLAND]. 
15 See generally Greenland, All Areas, XPATULATOR, 
http://www.xpatulator.com/cost-of-living-review/Greenland-All-
Areas_403.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). See also Joan Nymand Larsen, 
Climate change, natural resource dependency and supply shocks: The Case of 
Greenland, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NORTHERN REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 206 (Gorm Winther et al. eds., 2008). 
16 Mark Nuttall, Self-Rule in Greenland: Towards the World’s First 
Independent Inuit State?, 3-4/08 INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 64, 65 (2009). 
17 GREENLAND, supra note 14. 
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change is positive or not, depends to a large extent on the 
choices made by the business enterprises leading the 
development process. 
Greenland is both the world’s largest island and its least 
densely populated state.18 Most of Greenland is an uninhabited 
ice sheet with the population living in towns and settlements 
dotting the coast. These isolated communities are connected only 
by sea and air.19  
From the early 1700’s Greenland was a colony of Norway 
and then Denmark, who retained possession until the twentieth 
century.20 Colonial status became Danish county status in 1953, 
although Greenlanders remained politically marginalized within 
Denmark.21 A strong push from civil society resulted in the 
Home Rule Act of 1979, which granted partial autonomy.22 
However, it was not till 2008 that Greenland finally gained 
“Self-Rule,” a kind of de-facto independence.23 Yet, Denmark 
retains control over key functions, as well as foreign affairs.24  
Today, Greenland is an economically marginalized country 
with high underemployment and a very high cost of living.25 
With little industry, fragmented infrastructure, and a poor 
                                                 
18 Joshua Calder, World Island Info Blog, 2010-09-06; The 2008 Revision 
Population Database, Esa.un.org. 2009-03-11. Retrieved 2010-09-06. 
19 See generally The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gl.html (last 
visited Sep. 16, 2013); Programming Document for the Sustainable 
Development of Greenland, available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ 
where/octs_and_greenland/documents/pdsd_and_annexes_greenland_en.pdf. 
20 See generally History of Greenland, THE OFFICIAL TOURISM SITE OF 
GREENLAND, http://www.greenland.com/en/about-greenland/kultur-sjael/ 
historie.aspx. 
21 For a strong review of modern political history in Greenland see 
NATALIA LOUKACHEVA, THE ARCTIC PROMISE: LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
AUTONOMY OF GREENLAND AND NUNAVUT (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 The World Factbook, supra note 19. 
24 Nuttal, supra note 16, at 65. 
25 Greenland’s purchase power parity ranks 191st out of 229 worldwide. 
Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), The World Factbook, 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-
factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=Greenland&countryCode=gl
&regionCode=noa&rank=191#gl (last visited Sep. 16, 2013). 
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educational system, Greenlanders are highly dependent on their 
government for employment, housing, and other support.26 The 
Government in turn is highly dependent on subsidies from 
Denmark, which currently total $600 million USD, or roughly 
one third of the total annual budget.27 
 
2. Extractive Industry Development 
 
There is no question that extractive industry development is 
simultaneously the engine, promise, and anathema of 
Greenland’s future. Within the context of this marginalized 
indigenous state, the potential impact of extractive industry 
development is nothing short of monumental.28 Reserves of iron, 
gold, uranium, rubies, and rare earths have inspired roughly 90 
mining projects to enter the approval pipeline.29 Extraction of oil 
and gas is further off, but the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum 
                                                 
26 Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], OECD TERRITORIAL 
REVIEWS: NORA REGION 2011: THE FAROE ISLANDS, GREENLAND, ICELAND AND 
COASTAL NORWAY 44 (2011), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
9789264097629-en.  At least 44% of the work force is directly employed by the 
government, while countless others depend indirectly on the public sector 
indirectly for their jobs. Id. 
27 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, The World Factbook: North 
America: Greenland, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Dec. 13, 2012), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gl.html. 
28 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Representative of London Mining, in Green. (Aug. 27, 2012). 
29 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Representative of BMP, in Green. (Aug. 20, 2012); see also Naalakkersuisut, 
Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, Naalakkersuisut: Government of Greenland 
(Sep. 8, 2013, 10:45AM), http://www.bmp.gl/ (referencing promotional 
materials from the BMP). Greenland does, however, have a historical legacy of 
mining, including a now-depleted cryolite mine near Ivigtut that was a major 
contributor to Greenland’s economy before 1973. Lise Lyck & Jorgen 
Taagholt, Greenland—Its Economy and Resources, 40 ARCTIC 50, 57 (1987). 
3.5 million tons of cryolite, which aids in aluminum production, was extracted 
before depletion. Id. Between 1956-1962, 130,000 tons of lead and zinc were 
extracted from the Mesters Vig site in East Greenland. Id. “600[,]000 ton[s] of 
coal were mined at Qutdliqssad[,] on the island of Disko” between 1924-1972. 
Id. at 58. 
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is currently selling off exploration rights, and nearly all the 
major international petroleum companies are buying.30  
Most importantly, extractive industry could fund 
Greenland’s full and final independence. Currently, the 
Government of Denmark’s $600 million subsidy to the 
Government of Greenland allows the Government of Greenland 
to function, but also creates a dependency on Denmark that 
precludes full autonomy and statehood. Taxes and revenue 
sharing from extractive industries could easily generate enough 
income for the government to refuse the Danish subsidy, thereby 
opening an opportunity for Greenland’s long sought recognition 
as a fully independent state.31 Furthermore, large scale 
development of mineral resources and the potential for massive 
oil and gas resources could potentially, if properly managed, 
transform Greenland into a wealthy, social democratic state on 
the Scandinavian model, improving weak education and health 
systems and solving unemployment.32  
Political and financial independence mean even more when 
it is remembered that Greenland is a rare example of a majority 
indigenous state.33 Retaining a strong connection to its 
indigenous identity through traditional livelihoods, cultural 
values and social systems, Greenland has a great deal to gain 
                                                 
30 Nuttall, supra note 16, at 65-66. “In 2007, using northeast Greenland 
as a prototype for its circum-Arctic oil and gas appraisal, the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the East Greenland Rift Basins 
Province could hold over 31 billion barrels of oil, gas and natural gas liquids 
(Gautier 2007). USGS estimates that the waters off Greenland’s west coast 
could contain more than 110 billion barrels of oil (roughly 42% of Saudi 
Arabia’s reserves).” Id. 
31 Id. at 65. Greenland’s Premier Hans Enoksen has expressed a desire for 
independence in 2021, a date marking three hundred years since Danish 
colonization. Id. 
32 The obvious example would be Norway, which claims more than 90% 
of petroleum profits as taxes, places graduated knowledge and technology 
transfer requirements on foreign extractive companies, and reinvests petroleum 
revenues in social programs and long term state investment. See infra. note 92. 
33 While the definitions in this area can become contentious, other 
examples of majority indigenous states include, Bolivia, Fiji, Guatemala, Papua 
New Guinea and Tonga. Even among this group it could be argued that the 
indigenous population of Greenland is more homogenous and retains a stronger 
connection to a sustainable resource based lifestyle. 
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3.  Cultural Context and the Mixed Economy 
 
To fully understand the potential effect of extractive 
industry development in Greenland, it is necessary have an at 
least cursory understanding of the Greenlandic people.34 
Greenlanders make up a part of the larger Inuit ethnic group, 
which encompasses indigenous peoples in Arctic Canada, 
Russia, and the United States. Speaking an Eskimo Aleut 
language known (in English) as Greenlandic, their culture is 
closely tied to the Arctic’s natural resources, relying on marine 
mammals, fishing, hunting and foraged plants.35 
These “subsistence activities” embody the definition of 
indigenous subsistence offered by the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council; "a highly complex notion that includes vital economic, 
social, cultural and spiritual dimensions."36 As such, the 
economic (subsistence) activities practiced by Greenlanders 
exert far more cultural influence than purely providing actual 
subsistence, or even economic benefit.37 
Modern Greenlanders exhibit what Wolfe and Walker have 
called the “mixed economy.”38 That is, they participate in both 
                                                 
34 The Author is neither an anthropologist, nor does he aspire to be one. 
The purpose of this review is merely to highlight some common generalizations 
about this complex society, and help others to understand how this culture may 
impact and be impacted by extractive development. The author would like to 
thank the many Greenlanders who provided guidance on this subject and take 
full credit for any mistakes. 
35 See generally George W. Wenzel, Canadian Inuit Subsistence and 
Ecological Instability - If the Climate Changes, Must the Inuit?, POLAR 
RESEARCH, 28, 89–99 (2009). 
36 See generally Birger Poppel, Are subsistence activities in the Arctic 
part of the market economic reality or – is the market economy a part of a 
subsistence based mixed economy?, in CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH IN 
GREENLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 1992-2010 349, 349-65. 
37 Id. Interviews by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representatives, in Green. (Aug. 16, 17, 27, 2012). 
38 Id. at 350. Wolfe and Walker were noting that after WWII, it was 
expected that indigenous communities in the Arctic would rapidly integrate into 
the market economies of the ‘West.’ However, the reality that emerged was far 
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traditional subsistence activities as well as participating in the 
market economy, without any intention of engaging in one to the 
exclusion of the other. Greenlanders generally participate in far 
fewer “subsistence activities” than other indigenous societies in 
the Arctic.39 Yet, in a clear indication of the 
cultural/social/political importance of the subsistence economy, 
90% of Greenlanders have received gifts of traditional fish and 
meat products and fully 95% said that food was important to 
maintaining cultural identity.40 A surprising 67% of 
Greenlanders get half or more of their nutritional content from 
these traditional foods.41 
This is hardly an example of resistance to change and 
‘modernity.’ Rather, it may surprise many readers to learn that 
there is a positive correlation between increased income and the 
participation in subsistence activities in Greenland.42 Given that 
82% of Greenlanders are either somewhat or very satisfied with 
their business activities, this mixed economy appears in fact to 
be an outcome of an alternative economic model than a 
confrontation between economic systems.43 
This does not mean that Greenlanders have achieved a level 
of economic security that completely addresses their needs, 
however. With nearly 30% of the labor force not working, 
extremely low levels of education and a serious competency gap 
in core areas like law, medicine and public administration, 
Greenland is a country in transition with a long way to go before 
achieving the economic and social robustness of its Western 
European neighbors.44 In addition to these problems, climate 
                                                                                                 
different, and this resistance to fully integrating, or rather being subsumed into, 
the market economy continues to dominate Greenlandic society. Id. 
39 Id. at 354. 
40 Id. at 356-57. 
41 Id. at 357.  See also Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic, Inuit, 
Saami, and the Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka, SURVEY OF LIVING 
CONDITIONS IN THE ARCTIC, http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org (Last visited 
Sept. 20, 2013) (providing full set of relevant data on living conditions in the 
Arctic with extensive resources). 
42 Id. at 358. For sure, the highest income bracket practices the most 
subsistence activities, while the lowest practices the least. Id. 
43 Id. at 359. 
44 Annex: Programming Document for the Sustainable Development of 
Greenland, ch. 2 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/ 
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change has already created serious problems for indigenous 
communities in far northern Greenland, problems they are 
neither technologically nor economically prepared to solve.45  
What Greenland’s mixed economy does demonstrate is the 
fact that Greenlanders do not operate under that traditional 
state/market binary, as discussed by Lawrence and Gibson.46 
Therefore, extractive industry business enterprises should be 
aware that many Greenlanders are operating with a different 
fundamental understanding of the role of the free market, the 
role of the state, and even the fundamental goals of development 
and free enterprise. For an easily cognizable example, 
Greenland’s sharing of traditional foods remains highly relevant 
as a way of preserving cultural identity even for college educated 
Greenlandic professionals living in Nuuk. Considering 
Greenland’s fragile Arctic environment, this suggests that even 
limited environmental damage hundreds of miles away may have 
a meaningful impact on the indigenous rights of all 
Greenlanders. 
A further cultural challenge facing would-be extractive 
industry developers is the cultural relationship to authority and 
decision making. As a newly post-colonial or even slightly still-
colonial society, Greenlanders have a self-identified, troubled 
relationship with external authority.47 On the one hand, 
Greenlanders feel subject to intensive international pressure, 
from environmentalists, capitalists, international organizations, 
                                                                                                 
octs_and_greenland/documents/pdsd_and_annexes_greenland_en.pdf. 
45See, e.g., James D. Ford & Chris Furgal, Foreword to the special issue: 
climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability in the Arctic. 28 POLAR 
RESEARCH 1.1 (2008); James D. Ford & Christina Goldhar, Climate change 
vulnerability and adaptation in resource dependent communities: a case study 
from West Greenland, 54 CLIM. RES. 181 (2012). 
46 See generally Rebecca Lawrence & Chris Gibson, Obliging Indigenous 
Citizens? Shared Responsibility Agreements in Australia Aboriginal 
Communities, 21 CULTURAL STUDIES 650 (2007); Rebecca Lawrence, 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Supply-Chains and Saami Claims: Tracing 
the Political in the Finnish Forestry Industry, 45 GEO. RESEARCH 167 (2007). 
47 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member of 
Parliament, in Green. (Aug. 26, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with 
Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative, in Green. (Aug. 16, 2012); 
Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Sources, Impact 
Assessment Professionals, in Green. (Aug. 27, 2012). 
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and foreign governments alike.48 The response to this pressure is 
often to simply shut down.49 Given the importance placed on 
indigenous consultation and participation during the recent 
elections, this poses a significant challenge.50  
 
B. Legal Frameworks 
 
1. Legal Protection for Indigenous Rights  
 
Greenland does not have a coordinated and systematic 
approach to the protection of indigenous rights. In fact, there are 
no indigenous-specific legal protections at all.51 As a majority 
indigenous country, indigenous specific legal protections have 
not been at the forefront of the government agenda.52 Instead, it 
is argued here that the Government of Greenland relies on the 
participatory democratic process and mandatory consultation 
frameworks for the protection of indigenous rights. Whether or 
not this approach has proven effective will be discussed at length 
below.53 
From the perspective of extractive industry business 
enterprise, “Greenland is a remote extractive periphery where the 
regulatory process and less than stringent legal requirements for 
environmental hearings make it an attractive place to invest.”54 
                                                 
48 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member of 
Parliament, in Green. (Aug. 26, 2012). An oft-cited example of just this 
problem was the strong negative response Greenpeace received when they sent 
representatives to Greenland. Id. While ostensibly trying to help the 
Greenlandic population to protect its marine resources, Greenpeace’s strong, 
often militant opposition to whaling is perceived by Greenlander’s as an 
imposition and as a result, Greenpeace was met by protest and dismissal. Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See infra note 6. 
51 Inuit Circumpolar Council: Greenland, Universal Periodic Review-
Denmark 2011: Joint Submission-Greenland NGOs (2010). 
52 Id. 
53 The deeper questions of where Greenland ought to stand in regards to 
ILO 169 and what it means to have a majority indigenous state are beyond the 
scope of this paper. None-the-less, these questions deserve significant study, 
which, to this author’s knowledge, has not been conducted. 
54 Nuttall, supra note 16, at 68. See also Interview by Rutherford 
Hubbard with Anonymous Source, representative of BMP, in Green. (Aug. 20, 
2012). 
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With government “ownership” of 100% of land and natural 
resources, and an obvious fiscal incentive to expand resource 
exploitation, Greenland appears a very promising partner 
indeed.55 
This dissonance regarding land ownership and indigenous 
rights raises a core question: As an indigenous majority country, 
are the actions of a democratically elected government de facto 
in compliance with ILO 169 requirements and the fundamental 
rights of indigenous peoples? It is this question that lies at the 
crux of Greenland’s complex relationship with ILO 169 and 
extractive industry development generally. This question is also 
a key source of potential risk for extractive industry business 
enterprises, as discussed below. 
 
2. Extractive Industry Regulation 
 
The Greenlandic Parliament is the primary legislative body 
in Greenland and oversees extractive industries, among its many 
functions. However, through the Mineral Resources Act of 2009, 
the Parliament granted the Government of Greenland all 
administrative responsibility and authority over the development 
of mineral and hydrocarbon resources.56 In practice, these 
functions are executed solely by the Bureau of Minerals and 
Petroleum (BMP), a government agency established by the 
Parliament.57  
Of the approximately 90 mineral extraction projects 
currently at some level of development in Greenland, all but a 
few remain in the exploration stage.58 Thus far, the process has 
                                                 
55 See also The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009) (Green.). “The 
Greenland Self-Government has the right to control and use mineral resources 
in the subsoil in Greenland.” Id. at pt. 1 ¶2(1). 
56 The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009). 
57 The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009) pt. I (Green.); In addition 
to the Minerals Act, there is similar legislation regulating environmental and 
labor that impacts extractive industry enterprises and indigenous rights. 
However, the Mineral Resources Act, appears to override all other relevant 
legislation in case of conflict and as such has become the primary, if not sole 
relevant piece of legislation. Whether this is in fact the case has yet to come 
before the courts. 
58 The most advanced mega project currently in the approval process is 
that of the ISUA Mine, proposed by the London Mining Corporation. This 
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been slowed by the unique challenges faced by beginning 
projects in a new and challenging locale.59 However, one project, 
the Isua Mine, is currently in the final stages of the application 
process.60 If the project is approved, it is expected to result in a 
flurry of activity and the rapid issuance of prospecting and 
extraction licenses, although the March elections cast some 
doubt on this prediction.61  
The BMP is currently operating under the assumption, 
supported by the Mineral Resources Act, that all resources are 
government property and therefore has the authority to grant 
exclusive extraction rights to minerals.62 However, as the 
President of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference Aqqaluk Lynge, 
points out, the government does not own the land and 
resources.63 Under the Constitution of Greenland, the 
Greenlandic people own the land and resources, and the 
Greenlandic people may not be as willing a development partner 
                                                                                                 
large scale mining operation is located north of Nuuk at the end of Nuuk Fjord. 
It will require the construction of a refinery as well as living accommodations 
for workers, as the site is too far from any existing settlements; Information on 
the current status of mineral and petroleum licensing, as well as the ISUA 
project specifically, refer to the official Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum 
licensing map, available at http://geuskort.geus.dk/greenlandPortalMap/gis_ 
greenlandPortal.jsp?map_size=999%20497. A list of current licenses is also 
available at http://www.bmp.gl/images/stories/minerals/list_of_licences/ 
list_of_licences.pdf. 
59 The majority is being undertaken by junior corporations that rely on 
regular injections of fresh capital, which has further slowed the process; 
Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, private sector 
representative, in Green. (Aug. 27, 2012).  See generally Larsen, supra note 15. 
60 Presentations by London Mining and the Bureau of Minerals and 
Petroleum (August 27, 2012). 
61 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
representative from BMP, in Green. (Aug. 29, 2012); Interview by Rutherford 
Hubbard with Anonymous Source, private sector representative, in Green. 
(Aug. 29, 2012). 
62 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
representative from BMP, in Green. (Aug. 29, 2012). 
63 Interview with Aqqalaq Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Counsel, 
Greenland the Association Hingitaq 1953 (The Outcasts 1953), Thule, Green. 
(August 27, 2012). 
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as the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum.64 The Self-Rule 
Agreements of 2009 make clear that Greenland and not 
Denmark, has control over natural resources.65 However, a 
translation problem between Greenlandic and Danish texts of the 
Self Rule Government agreement make the interpretation of this 
provision difficult.66 
 
3. The Extractive Industry Licensing Process 
 
The Act establishes a “one door policy” which grants the 
BMP exclusive control over all extractive industry development 
licensing and management from prospecting to 
decommissioning.67 The principle is that potential resource 
developers need to visit only “one door” during the entirety of 
the resource exploitation process.  The BMP is in charge of 
licensing, monitoring and all other aspects of the extractive 
industry process. The Parliament does not have veto authority 
regarding the issuance of licenses, but the BMP does have the 
responsibility to report to the Parliament on a yearly basis.68 
Extractive industry enterprises pay significant, although far 
from unusual tax rates of 30% and 37% respectively for non-
                                                 
64 Interview with Aqqaluk Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Counsel, 
Greenland the Association Hingitaq 1953 (The Outcasts 1953), Thule, Green. 
(August 28, 2012). 
65 Slim Allagui, Greenland to take greater control of natural resources, 
THE AGE, (June 20, 2009), http://www.theage.com.au/environment/greenland-
to-take-greater-control-of-natural-resources-20090619-
cr6g.html#ixzz2TKqg6fhU. 
66 Interview with Aqqalaq Lynge (August 27, 2012). 
67 See generally The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009) (Green.); 
The BMP actively advertises the one-door policy, which it sees (quite 
accurately) as a strong selling point for foreign investment. See BUREAU OF 
MINERALS AND PETROLEUM, WEST GREENLAND, http://www.geus.dk/ 
ghexis/pdf/AAPG03-A3.pdf. The one-door policy was also mentioned by the 
Director of London Mining as a key advantage to doing business in Greenland. 
Public Consultation with Director of London Mining (August 27, 2012). 
68 “(1) Each year the Greenland Government presents to the Greenland Parliament 
an account of licences granted, applications for licences and implemented and planned 
invitations to apply for licenses. (2) Each year the Greenland Government prepares a 
public report on the matters mentioned in subsection (1) above. The Greenland 
Government submits the report to the Greenland Parliament.” The Mineral Resources 
Act (Act No. 7/2009) pt. 4 (Green.). 
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licensed and Greenland licensed business enterprise 
respectively.69 This is in addition to a standard corporate tax rate. 
Given that the Greenlandic Government does not charge for the 
right to engage in resource extraction, these rates are relatively 
low. This fact has not been lost on some indigenous activists 
who are actively opposing what they consider to be a natural 
resource give-away.70 Given the fundamental disagreement as to 
natural resource ownership in Greenland, this remains a very 
contentious issue and a potential legal challenge to extractive 
industry development. 
Petroleum rights are likewise subject to 100% state 
ownership under the Act. Through the administration of the 
BMP, petroleum rights are granted exclusively through joint 
operations agreements and are subject to significant taxation.71 
The application approval process for hydrocarbon extraction 
remains undefined, as currently no licensee has gone beyond the 
exploration stage.72 That being said, business enterprises seeking 
to conduct seismic studies are required to hold consultations with 
                                                 
69 For an accessibly comprehensive review of extractives taxation 
regimes, particularly in developing nations, see Bryan Land, Capturing a Fair 
Share of Fiscal Benefits in the Extractive Industry, 18 TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, no. 1, 2009 at 157, available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/ 
diaeiia20097a7_en.pdf. 
70 Author’s personal notes taken during the Public Consultation August 
27, 2012. 
71 Foreign corporations are required to partner with the state oil company 
Nunaoil, which is a 15% quiet, risk free partner. So far two licensing rounds 
have been completed and 27 prospecting licenses have been issued. In the 
majority of cases, licenses are purchased by consortium of extractive 
enterprises, with one business enterprise acting as the operator, others 
providing money and consulting and NunaOil as the silent partner. This 
consortium approach reflects the current reality that petroleum extraction in 
Greenland, while very promising, still presents a great deal of risk; Interview 
by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, representative from BMP, in 
Green. (Aug. 20, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous 
Source, Civil Society Representative, in Green. (Aug. 21, 2012); Note that 
while NunaOil bears no risk during the exploration phase, it must become an 
active partner, including providing a relative share of financing, from the 
moment petroleum is first extracted. For more information refer to the BMP 
website. BUREAU OF MINERALS AND PETROLEUM, http://www.bmp.gl/. 
72 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
representative from BMP, in Green. (Aug. 20, 2012). 
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affected communities.73 In the minerals area, the process is more 
defined, especially as the first mega-project under the new 
regulatory system is currently in the final stages of approval.74 
Under the Act, potential licensees are required to submit an 
application to the BMP, containing a Strategic Impact 
assessment, (SIA), including an Environmental Impact 
Assessment, Social Impact Assessment and Economic Impact 
Assessment as well as an Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA).75 
In addition to the requirements described above, potential 
licensees are required to submit detailed plans for the full extent 
of the exploitation process, including extractive operations, 
expected revenues, expected employment requirements and 
staffing strategy, and proof of financing.76 Taken together the 
application process has proven time consuming, although 
perhaps not greatly so given the size of proposed projects.77 
Following the submission of the Impact Assessments, 
public consultations must be held in all affected communities.78 
                                                 
73 See BUREAU OF MINERALS AND PETROLEUM, BMP GUIDELINES FOR 
PREPARING AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (EIA) REPORT FOR 
MINERAL EXPLOITATION IN GREENLAND 8 (2nd ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.bmp.gl/images/stories/minerals/EIA_guidelines_mining.pdf; see 
BUREAU OF MINERALS AND PETROLEUM, GUIDELINES FOR SOCIAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENTS FOR MINING PROJECTS IN GREENLAND ¶ 1.1, 2.2, Appendix 5 
(2009), available at http://www.bmp.gl/images/stories/minerals/sia_guideline/ 
sia_guidelines.pdf. See generally The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009) 
(Green.), pts. 15-16.  
74 The Isua Mine Project, an initiative of London Mining Corporation is 
publicly considered to be a test-case for the licensing system, a fact supported 
by informal conversations with both government and civil society 
representatives. 
75 The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009) (Green.). The IBAs are a 
three way contract between the government, the municipality and the company. 
They are dynamic contracts which are required to be revisited each year for re-
negotiation and evaluation. It appears possible for the BMP to revoke a license 
for failure to engage in the re-negotiation process, but the reality remains 
unclear. Id. at 19, 43, 86. 
76 See The Mineral Resources Act (Act No. 7/2009) (Green.). Additional 
license application information, available at BUREAU OF MINERALS AND 
PETROLEUM, http://www.bmp.gl/. 
77 To give some context, London Mining has spent the past seven years 
preparing their application, and approval is not expected until next year. 
Author’s personal notes taken during the Public Consultation August 27, 2012. 
78 See generally supra Part I.B.iii. 
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The content and procedure of these consultations is not defined. 
Until recently, and still by law, the Business enterprises are 
solely responsible for conducting these consultations, a process 
generally outsourced.79 However, in the recent London Mining 
Ltd. case, the BMP has implemented a series of four public 
consultations, in response to concerns repeatedly expressed 
regarding the efficacy of the corporate-led consultation 
process.80  
The outcome of the consultation process should be revisions 
to the application. There is currently no requirement that the 
consultation process directly affects the application or approval 
process, nor is there a requirement that the applicant state why it 
has not made changes based on specific recommendations from 
the consultation process.81 
 
C. Recent Developments 
 
The integration of extractive development, legal regulation 
and indigenous culture can be devastating for local communities, 
as demonstrated time and time again in Nigeria, the Amazon 
basin and in Southeast Asia.82 In Greenland, tensions between 
indigenous cultural realities and rapid extractive development 
have been steadily increasing, culminating with the opposition 
victory in March, 2013. 
The Parliamentary Elections in Greenland were a real game-
changer for Greenlandic extractive industry. Broad support for 
foreign investment in extractive industry remains in Greenland, 
                                                 
79 Interview with Ole Kjaer, Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, in Nuuk 
(Aug. 20, 2012). 
80 Id. For more information on concerns regarding the consultation 
process see supra Part I.B.i. 
81 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Representative of London Mining, in Green. (Aug. 27, 2012). Prior to the 2013 
Elections, the BMP had already suggested that changes in the consultation 
process were likely. Interview with Ole Kjaer, supra note 79. With the 
elections however, it is all but guaranteed that this legal framework will be 
fundamentally changed. The nature and extent of that change remains unclear. 
As will be discussed later in this paper, business enterprises may have a role to 
play in improving the regulatory framework while still maintaining a favorable 
environment for investment. Id. 
82 See infra. Note 69. 
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but the parameters of that investment are set to change 
significantly.83 Outgoing Prime Minister Kupik Kleist explained 
this sudden change with the eloquence of the songwriter he is, 
"[i]t has been a slap in the face."84  
While not entirely unexpected, the results of the election 
were all but unimaginable just a few months before. Last year, 
EU Vice President Antonio Tajani was in Greenland to sign a 
Memorandum of Understanding regarding raw material 
exploitation to Europe.85 Now, Greenlanders have clearly 
rejected a policy of free exploitation, in favor of a measured 
approach that takes into account traditionally Inuit hunting and 
fishing activities.86  
The primary concern that drove the 2013 election result was 
the demonstrated lack of participation and oversight from 
Greenlanders themselves. Prime Minister-elect Hammond ran on 
a platform that maintained, “[t]he most important thing for us is 
to work with someone who also views citizen involvement as the 
most important thing.”87 She further insisted that “[d]evelopment 
must be fair to all Greenlanders – both those in villages and 
those in cities.”88 If this sounds like anti-capitalist or anti-
imperialist rhetoric, it is, but not necessarily in a negative way. 
Rather, in her first interview following the election, Hammond 
made clear: 
 
We are welcoming companies and countries that are 
interested in investing in Greenland . . . . At the same 
time we have to be aware of the consequences as a 
people. Greenland should work with countries that 
have the same values as we have, on how human 
rights should be respected. We are not giving up our 
values for investors' sake.89 
 
                                                 
83 See Voters Deliver Backlash, supra note 5. 
84 Id. 
85 Scrutton, supra note 4. 
86 Macalister, supra note 5. 
87 Ghosh, supra note 5. 
88 Id. 
89 Macalister, supra note 5. 
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In practice, this means that certain projects, like the 
controversial Isua Mine project near Nuuk, may see their 
operating space restricted. Hammond has already promised to 
revise a law that was targeted to allow the Isua developer, 
London Mining PLC,  to import some 2,000 Chinese workers, 
willing to take far lower wages than local laborers.90 Increased 
oversight is also part of the plan. Secrecy over mining contracts 
and the degree of control wielded by foreign investors within the 
Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum were also contentious 
electoral issues.91 
The second major concern that led to electoral change was 
the common (and largely justified) perception that Greenland 
was getting a raw deal.92 Under the current regulatory 
framework, Greenland only received tax income when extractive 
corporations turned their first profit.93 Given the lengthy and 
difficult process of extracting resources in the Arctic, it is 
difficult to say when this would actually occur. As a result, many 
Greenlanders felt that this amounted to a give-away of natural 
resources, and Hammond has pledged to enforce royalty 
payments based on access to extractable resources and not just 
corporate profits.94 
The third concern that propelled Hammond to victory was 
concern regarding the environmental impact of mining. 
Greenland’s indigenous population continues to significantly 
rely on renewable resources, including hunting, fishing and 
gathering.95 Given the skepticism of many Greenlanders 
regarding the current oversight and management of extractable 
                                                 
90 Voters Deliver Backlash Over Greenland’s Minerals Rush, supra note 
5. 
91 Ghosh, supra note 5. 
92 In contrast, a country like Norway claims more than 78% of petroleum 
profits through taxes, while royalties can raise this percentage to over 90%. 
Ministry of Finance of the Government of Norway, Taxation on Petroleum 
Services, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-
topics/taxes-and-duties/bedriftsbeskatning/Taxation-of-petroleum-
activities.html?id=417318 . Accessed on 28/09/2013. 
93 Interview with Ole Kjaer, supra note 79. 
94 Voters Deliver Backlash, supra note 5; Greenland’s Elections: Below 
the Ice, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/ 
21573597-how-islands-politics-could-change-world-economy-below-ice. 
95 See supra Part I.B.iii; See also Ghosh, supra note 5. 
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resources, as well as the massive size of the proposed projects, 
such fears are well founded. 
Not all signs are negative for foreign investors however.  In 
addition to a broadly pro-mining stance (with caveats), 
Hammond and her Siumut party also sparred with the outgoing 
government on the issue of uranium extraction. Hammond wants 
to see the ban on this practice lifted, providing increased access 
to Greenland’s deposits of rare earths, which are often 
intertwined with uranium.96 This is no small issue, with just one 
of the identified rare earth deposits in southern Greenland 
already predicted to be the world’s largest source of rare earths 
outside of China.97 
Lastly, there is an undercurrent of nationalism and 
xenophobia that negatively impacted Kleists Inuit Ataqatigiit 
party. Partii Inuit, a protest party that is opposed to foreign 
influence from Denmark and China particularly, took 6.4% of 
the vote.98 Opposition to possible Chinese guest workers in the 
mines and refineries was one cause, as was the impression that 
the BMP is largely staffed by young, pro-industry Danish 
bureaucrats, with little knowledge or admiration for Greenland’s 
indigenous community.99 Although these allegations are at least 
partly true, it is not yet clear if this nationalist sentiment is 
actually reasoned critique or merely an expression of 
Greenlandic indigenous pride.  
What will happen next in Greenland is difficult to 
determine. While some see a major transformation of the country 
in the near future, others feel that this election marks only 
superficial change.100 What is clear is that extractive industries 
operating in Greenland must take indigenous rights seriously if 
they are to avoid economic and ethical risk going forward. 
                                                 
96 Greenland’s Elections: Below the Ice, supra note 94. 
97 Alistair Scrutton, Mining, China Central Issues in Greenland Election, 
REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/11/us-
greenland-election-idUSBRE92907F2013031. See also In Vote, Resource-rich 
Greenland Debates New Global Role, supra note 9. 
98 Greenland’s Elections: Below the Ice, supra note 94. 
99 See generally Interviews, supra notes 77, 79; See also In Vote, 
Resource-rich Greenland Debates New Global Role, supra note 9. 
100 Personal correspondence with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
Greenland Office, April-May, 2013. 





II. THE R2R FRAMEWORK AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
The preceding section has identified a fragile and 
contentious legal environment for indigenous rights in 
Greenland. Recent political changes are discouraging for foreign 
investment and the regulatory system is likely to be in flux. 
These political changes constitute significant risk and have 
already had tangible and substantial economic impacts on 
extractive industry corporations operating in Greenland. This 
leaves business enterprises in a challenging position. The 
benefits of investing in Greenland remain high, but the risk is 
also significant. Because this risk is based on indigenous rights, 
it moves beyond typical political and legal risk assessment 
frameworks. 
 
A. Background to the Right to Respect Framework and 
U.N. Guiding Principles 
 
Fortunately, there is some guidance available for such 
business enterprises, in the form of the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy (PRR) Framework generally, and the Responsibility to 
Respect (R2R) Framework and the corresponding U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs) specifically.101 
Developed by Harvard Professor John Ruggie acting as Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General, the PRR Framework 
and the GPs are the product of six years of “research and 
consultations with governments, business and civil society on 
five continents.”102 The PRR Framework is built on three pillars; 
the State Responsibility to Protect, the Corporate Responsibility 
to Respect and the right of victims of human rights abuses to an 
effective Remedy.103 The resulting Guiding Principles (GPs) and 
                                                 
101 See infra notes 103 and 104. 
102 United Nations, The U.N. "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework 
for Business and Human Rights, (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home. 
103 Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and 
Transnat'l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. 
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accompanying commentary provide a road map for human rights 
protection.104  
There is an admittedly vast panoply of international 
corporate responsibility and human rights standards that are to 
some extent relevant to the challenge of understanding corporate 
responsibility vis-à-vis indigenous rights in Greenland.105  From 
that wide selection of options, including codes of conduct 
tailored to extractive industry, the R2R Framework and the GPs 
have been chosen deliberately for this paper for three reasons.  
First, the R2R Framework actively seeks to bring a new 
level of consensus to the relationship between business and 
human rights. To borrow the words of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, the PRR Framework sets: “both a new and 
clear benchmark and represents an important milestone in the 
evolving understanding of human rights in our societies. Clarity 
about the baseline expectations of business with regards to 
human rights is [the] first important step towards developing 
appropriate and effective responses to such problems.”106 The 
Guiding Principles are new, but they are already being described 
                                                                                                 
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Human_Right
s_Working_Group/29Apr08_7_Reprt_of_SRSG_to_HRC.pdf [hereinafter 
Ruggie]. The PRR Framework was completed in 2008, and the Human Rights 
Council requested Special Representative Ruggie to expand his mandate and 
provide implementation guidance to the Framework. See also Contribution of 
the United Nations system as a whole to the advancement of the business and 
human rights agenda and the dissemination and implementation of the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/21/L.14/Rev.1, 21st. Sess. (Sept. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Contribution of 
the United Nations]. 
104 See Contribution of the United Nations, supra note 103. 
105 See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2, 55th Sess. (Aug. 26, 2003); OECD, OECD 
GUIDELINES FOR MULTI-NATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.ht
m; INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY, (3rd ed. 2001). 
106 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide, P 1, 
HR/PUB/12/02 (2012) [hereinafter the Corporate Responsibility to Respect 
Human Rights]. 
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as “a turning point in the debate on the responsibilities of 
business to society.107 
Second, the R2R Framework has received widespread 
support from a diverse set of stakeholders. The Office of the 
High Commissioner of Human Rights has wholeheartedly 
endorsed the GPs as a unifying approach to corporate 
responsibility, stating: 
 
The Guiding Principles have gained extensive support 
from businesses and civil society as well as States. A 
number of other international and regional organizations 
have reflected them in their own standards, and more are 
expected to do so in the months and years to come. Many 
businesses around the world are already looking at how 
they can implement the Guiding Principles in their 
operations.108 
 
Third, the R2R Framework explicitly seeks to provide the 
foundation for social compliance on a global scale.109 In 
                                                 
107 Jim Baker, The U.N. Guiding Principles – Opportunities, Challenges - 
One Year Later, INSTITUTES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/guest/un-guiding-principles-one-year-
later.html. Special Representative Ruggie himself referred to the Principles in 
the following terms: “[c]ouncil endorsement of the Guiding Principles, by itself, 
will not bring business and human rights challenges to an end. But it will mark 
the end of the beginning: by establishing a common global platform for action, 
on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing 
any other promising longer-term developments.” Guiding Principles, supra 
note 11, ¶ 13, at 5. 
108 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 2. “Over the past year, for example, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises have been updated to reflect the Guiding Principles.” Jonathan 
Bonnitcha, The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: The 
Implications for Enterprises and Their Lawyers, BUS. & HUM. RTS. REV., Fall 
2012, at 14, 15. 
109 There are numerous other guidelines for business enterprises seeking 
to demonstrate effective social compliance in the extractive sector. The most 
notable of these are ISO Standard 26000, the International Center for Mining 
and Minerals Guidelines and the IFC Guidelines. These standards are 
interesting in their own right and may prove useful to extractive industries 
operating in Greenland. However, as the purpose of this paper is to introduce 
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Ruggie’s own words, the Guiding Principles are “a global 
standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises 
wherever they operate . . . [that] exists over and above 
compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights.”110  
However, it also important to recognize the limitations of 
the Guiding Principles. First, the Guiding Principles are not a 
manual providing precise guidance on steps business enterprises 
should take.111 While providing guidance, the principles can only 
provide a framework upon which analysis can be constructed. 
Therefore this paper seeks to operationalize the Guiding 
Principles in the specific and narrow context of foreign 
extractive industry business enterprises entering the Greenlandic 
market.”112 Second, the Guiding Principles are by no means the 
last word on business and human rights. Rather, the Guiding 
Principles “mark the end of the beginning: by establishing a 
common global platform for action, on which cumulative 
progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing any other 
promising longer-term developments.”113 Therefore, while the 
Guiding Principles provide an excellent framework for 
developing a rights protection strategy in Greenlandic extractive 
industry, it should be remembered that such a strategy must be 
dynamic, responsive, and willing to engage in the changing 
environment of the responsibility to respect as it evolves over 
time.114 
 
                                                                                                 
potential risks and risk management tools, there is not space to address them 
here. 
110 Bonnitcha, supra note 108, at 15. 
111 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 3. 
112 Ruggie, supra note 103, ¶ 51. 
113 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 13. 
114 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, Annex, at 6. Because human rights 
situations are dynamic, assessments of human rights impacts should be 
undertaken at regular intervals: prior to a new activity or relationship; prior to 
major decisions or changes in the operation (e.g. market entry, product launch, 
policy change, or wider changes to the business); in response to or anticipation 
of changes in the operating environment (e.g. rising social tensions); and 
periodically throughout the life of an activity or relationship. Guiding 
Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 18. 
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B. Understanding the R2R Framework and the Guiding 
Principles 
 
The Corporate Responsibility to Respect, read together with 
the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
describe the Responsibility to Respect as a process that leads to 
prevention and/or mitigation of the adverse human right impacts 




The Responsibility to Respect is built on two assumptions 
that are interwoven into the specific guidance laid out in the GPs. 
These assumptions are that the goal and purpose of corporate 
engagement with the GPs is to mitigate to the greatest extent 
possible adverse human rights impacts associated with their 
enterprise and that the responsibility to mitigate these impacts 
will depend significantly on the context in which and by which 
these impacts may occur.116  
GP 11 anchors the Corporate Responsibility to Respect.117 It 
directly invokes business enterprises to respect human rights and 
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should 
address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved. 
GP 13 specifically identifies the two core goals of corporate 
human rights compliance: Avoid causing or contributing to 
adverse human impacts and seek to prevent or mitigate adverse 
human rights impacts.118 The language used is interesting in that 
it is not absolute, using “avoid” rather than a more concrete 
prohibitory terminology. Furthermore, GP 13(b) recognizes that 
                                                 
115 See generally Guiding Principles, supra note 11; The Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106. 
116 Mitigation is defined in the R2R Interpretive Guide, Definitions 
Section as “actions taken to reduce [the] extent [of an impact], with any 
residual impact then requiring remediation. The mitigation of human rights 
risks refers to actions taken to reduce the likelihood of a certain adverse impact 
occurring.” The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at  7. 
117 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 17. 
118 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 13. 
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a certain number of human rights impacts are likely to occur.119 
Such language as follows: “[s]tates must protect against human 
rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third 
parties, including business enterprises.”120  This choice of weak 
language reflects the understanding that corporate 
responsibilities are highly contextual.  
 
2. Parameters of the Responsibility to Respect 
 
The R2R Framework highlights four parameters of the 
corporate responsibility to respect that are necessary to 
understand corporate responsibilities in a specific case. These 
parameters address the core questions of: What rights should be 
respected?; How responsible is a business enterprise for adverse 
human rights impacts caused by other parties? (complicity); How 
responsible is a business enterprise for indirect adverse human 
rights impacts? (sphere of influence); and, How does the 
responsibility change within different contexts? Each of these 
parameters is discussed below. 
 
 
i.  What rights should be respected? 
 
GP 12 defines the minimum scope of human rights included 
within the responsibility of business enterprises to respect human 
rights as “internationally recognized human rights—understood, 
at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights 
set out in the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.”121 However, a 
careful reading of the Guiding Principles Commentary, taken 
together with the Framework, make clear that in some contexts, 
numerous other international definitions are also relevant. 
In the past much of the corporate-human rights debate has 
centered on establishing a limited list of rights and identifying 
                                                 
119 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 13(b). 
120 See infra Part II.B.4; Guiding Principles, supra note 11, § I.A.i. 
121 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 12. 
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primary and secondary responsibilities accordingly.122 The PRR 
Framework views this as counterproductive and instead focuses 
on “specific responsibilities of companies with regard to all 
rights.”123 As a result, the sphere of relevant rights is deliberately 
left open-ended.124 
 
ii. How responsible is a business enterprise for adverse human 
rights impacts caused by other parties? 
 
 Complicity answers the question of to what extent a business 
enterprise is responsible for contributing to the actions of other 
parties.125 Such parties would include joint venture partners, up-
stream and downstream suppliers, contractors, sub-contractors 
and others. With both legal and non-legal meanings, the 
principle of complicity allows business enterprises to consider 
their risk factors regarding a variety of indirect adverse rights 
impacts with which they might be associated.126 Perhaps the 
most common example of complicity in this context is raised in 
the garment industry, where high-end garment producers are 
held morally liable (if not legally responsible) for the labor 
conditions in their overseas factories.  
 
iii. How responsible is a business enterprise for indirect 
adverse human rights impacts? 
 
 The concept of Sphere of Influence answers the question of 
how far a business enterprises responsibility extends over the 
indirect impact they have on the overall human rights 
environment in the country in which they are active. This 
emphasis on Sphere of Influence reflects the unusual position of 
many multinationals vis-à-vis human rights, relative economic 
strength and political influence, especially in the developing 
                                                 
122 See Ruggie, supra note 103, ¶ 51. 
123 Id. 
124 See infra Part III.B.i for a discussion on the applicability to 
Indigenous Rights Specifically. 
125 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 18-19.  See also The 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106, at 5. 
126 Id. 
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world.127 The Right to Respect framework argues that such 
business enterprises may have a responsibility to promote rights 
protection as the primary actor with the capacity to protect 
human rights, even if their specific operations are not actively 
linked to adverse human rights impacts.128  
 
iv.  How does the responsibility change within different 
contexts? 
 
 Context is an elusive concept to define. The Framework 
leaves this question open-ended, but does provide three 
parameters to assist business enterprises in identifying their 
operational context: circumstances of the enterprise, the level of 
risk of severe human rights impacts and nature and context of 
operations.129 This presents a complex analytical challenge, 
which can be understood to overlap with, but not necessarily be 
fully contained in the human rights due diligence process. Much 
like the responsibility to respect process overall, there is an 
implied necessity for feedback between identifying the context, 
shaping the due diligence process and then integrating the due 
diligence process back into identifying the context. This concept 
is captured in GP 17(c), which notes that human rights due 
diligence “[s]hould be on-going, recognizing that the human 
rights risks may change over time as the business enterprise’s 
operations and operating context evolve.”130  
 The corporate responsibility process is highly contextual and 
the GP’s make clear that this context will define the parameters 
of actual responsibilities.131 Contextualization of requirements 
can be seen explicitly in GPs 14, 17, 18 and 21. In regards to the 
process of meeting the responsibility to respect provided in the 
graphic below, context is an underlying principle that is 
identified by the initial due diligence process and used to define 
a more expansive due diligence process, as well as the policy 
                                                 
127 See generally, Beth Stevens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights. 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45 (2002). 
128 Ruggie, supra note 103, ¶ 23-24. 
129 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 17(b), at 18. 
130 Id. ¶ 17. 
131 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 20-21. 
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requirement and remediation process.  
 GP 14 explains this contextual element specifically, noting 
that “the scale and complexity of the means through which 
enterprises meet that responsibility may vary according to these 
factors and with the severity of the enterprise’s adverse human 
rights impacts.”132 This emphasis on context runs throughout the 
Responsibility to Respect and indeed could be considered an 
important contribution of the Framework and GPs to the larger 
discourse on corporate responsibility. 
 In regards to the specific measures to be taken by business 
enterprises, the policies and procedures should be “appropriate to 
their size and circumstances.”133 The importance of context is 
even noted in the definition of due diligence, provided in the 
Interpretive Guide.134 GP 17 detailing the human rights due 
diligence provisions highlights how due diligence itself “[w]ill 
vary in complexity with the size of the business enterprise, the 
risk of severe human rights impacts, and the nature and context 
of its operations.”135 When discussing the importance of 
consulting with affected partners also identifies the importance 
of context in structuring the consultation process.136  
                                                 
132 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 14. 
133 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 15. 
134 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 6 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (St. Paul, Minn., West 
1990)) (stating “such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is 
properly to be expected from, and in ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and 
prudent [person] under the particular circumstances; not measured by any 
absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case”). 
135 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 18. 
136 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 19-20. It should be noted that in 
this mode of analysis, the Framework differs from a more typical risk 
assessment model, which would focus on severity and probability. The reason 
for this is the Framework holds the position that human rights risk are not 
subject to simple cost benefit analysis, and even a highly unlikely human rights 
impact, if severe enough, is unacceptable, regardless of its probability. The 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106, at 39-40. 
Standard approaches to risk assessment may suggest that the probability of an 
adverse human rights impact is as important as its severity. However, if a 
potential human rights impact has low probability but high severity, the former 
consideration does not balance the latter. The severity of the impact is 
paramount, understood as the “scale, scope and irremediable character” of the 
impact. Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 15. Equally, human rights risks 




C. Applying Implementing the R2R Framework through the 
Guiding Principles 
 
 The R2R Framework, together with the GPs, present a series 
of interrelated steps that are both independent stages of action 
and reflexive process that provide the foundation for future 
iterations of the process of respecting rights.  Referred to 
colloquially as “know and show,” human rights due diligence 
leads to the establishment of a human rights policy, which in turn 
will include human rights due diligence, leading to specific steps 
to prevent adverse impacts, mitigate the effect of adverse 
impacts that have already occurred, and improve the human 






1. Human Rights Due Diligence 
 
 Human Rights Due Diligence is a complex, reflexive process 
that undergirds the corporate responsibility to respect. The GPs 
state that human rights due diligence “should cover adverse 
                                                                                                 
cannot be the subject of a simple cost-benefit analysis, whereby the costs to the 
enterprise of preventing or mitigating an adverse impact on human rights are 
weighed against the costs to the enterprise of being responsible for that harm. 
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human rights impacts that the enterprise may cause or contribute 
to through its own activities, or which may be directly linked to 
its operations, products or services by its business 
relationships.”137 Ideally, due diligence should commence as 
“early as possible in the lifetime of a particular activity or 
relationship.”138 However, initial due diligence is just a small 
part of the overall due diligence requirement. The GPs also call 
for human rights due diligence to be “on going,” especially when 
the business enterprise is engaged in a dynamic enterprise.139 In 
addition, due diligence forms the basis for the policy 
commitment and appropriate actions required of business 
enterprises. 
 The process of human rights due diligence entails “assessing 
the human rights context prior to a proposed business activity, 
where possible; identifying who may be affected; cataloguing the 
relevant human rights standards and issues; and projecting how 
the proposed activity and associated business relationships could 
have adverse human rights impacts on those identified.”140 
However, there is no single prescriptive formula for human 
rights due diligence.141 
 As with the other elements of the R2R Framework and the 
Guiding Principles, context plays a key role in identifying the 
scope and parameters of human rights due diligence. Broadly, 
the Identification of adverse human rights impacts has two 
elements, established in GP 18.142 These are accessing 
internal/external expertise and involving “meaningful 
consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant 
                                                 
137 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 6.2. 
138 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 18. 
139 Id. ¶ 17(c), at 18. “Human rights due diligence” is intended to help the 
enterprise know and show that it is respecting human rights throughout its 
operations and over time, including when there are changes in its operations or 
operating contexts. Except where those operations and contexts do not 
significantly change, this therefore requires on-going or iterative processes, 
rather than a one-off undertaking. Id. at 18. 
140 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 40. 
141 Id. at 32. 
142 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 18. 




 Firstly, business enterprises are expected to engage in self-
standing assessments of adverse human rights impacts and/or 
participate in larger scale social and environmental impact 
assessment processes.144 Which specific tools are used will 
depend on context, but in general it is likely that some elements 
of many different kinds of assessments will be used, including 
drawing on external expertise.145 The Implementation Guide 
notes that numerous tools and methodologies for completing 
human rights due diligence have been and continue to be 
developed for this purpose.146 
 The second element of due diligence consists of consulting 
with stakeholders.147 Consultation, also known as stakeholder 
engagement, is defined by the Human Rights Commission as “an 
on-going process of interaction and dialogue between an 
enterprise and its potentially affected stakeholders that enables 
the enterprise to hear, understand and respond, including through 
collaborative approaches to their interests and concerns.”148 The 
consultation requirements are set out in GP 18 (b), which calls 
for “[m]eaningful consultation with potentially affected groups 
and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the size of the 
business enterprise and the nature and context of the 
operation.”149 The Commentary is unequivocal regarding the 
importance of consultation with those potentially affected by 
adverse human rights impacts, and further stresses the 
importance when impacts are expected to be potentially 
severe.150 
 It is important to note that whenever possible, consultations 
                                                 
143 Id. at 18(b). 
144 Id. at 40. 
145 Id. at 43. 
146 Id. at 40. 
147 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶¶ 18(b) and 19; see also The 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106, at 31. 
148 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 8. 
149 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 18(b). 
150 Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
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should include the business enterprise itself.151 This reflects the 
emphasis of human rights due diligence on relationships and 
promotes an ongoing and responsive due diligence process. As 
noted specifically, “[i]t is also ill-advised for an enterprise to 
delegate engagement with its potentially affected stakeholders 
entirely to external experts, since this undermines its capacity to 
truly understand the perspectives of those it may impact and to 
build trusting and productive relationships with them.”152 
 
2. Policy Commitment and Integration 
 
 The second element of the responsibility to respect process is 
to establish a Policy Commitment. Defined by GP 16, the Policy 
Commitment is a way of embedding a commitment to respect 
human rights “from the top of the business enterprise through all 
of its functions.”153 The Policy Commitment should be approved 
at the highest level, be well informed, clearly elucidate 
expectations, be publicly available and be reflected in 
operational policies and procedures.154  
 The purpose of the policy commitment is two-fold. The first 
is to “clearly communicate the expectation of top management as 
to how all personnel should act.”155 The second is to lay the 
groundwork for more substantial due diligence and appropriate 
preventative and remedial measures regarding potential and 
actual adverse human rights impacts.156   
 In developing the Policy Commitment business enterprises 
should start with an understanding of the local context as defined 
in GP 14, achieved through a minimal due diligence process. 
Ideally, due diligence at this stage should include consultation 
with “individuals who are representative of those stakeholder 
                                                 
151 See id. See also The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human 
Rights, supra note 106, at 8. 
152 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 35. 
153 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 17. 
154 Id. ¶ 16; see also The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human 
Rights, supra note 106, at 26-27. 
155 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 27. 
156 See Figure 1 above. 
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groups most likely to be affected by the enterprise’s 
operations.”157 In practice however, this due diligence process is 
likely to be less expansive than the comprehensive due diligence 
process laid out in GP 17, and described above.  
 Having identified potential or actual human rights impact, 
appropriate action is required.158 Mitigation of adverse impacts 
requires appropriate action, which is the third element of the 
R2R process.159 Once again, the Responsibility to Respect 
Framework relies heavily on contextual analysis and varies 
significantly. The nature of “appropriate action” will be 
determined by the adverse rights impact, the degree of corporate 
responsibility for the impact, and the leverage of the business 
enterprise. Specifically, the human rights due diligence process 
should inform and shape a series of three actions designed to 
prevent and/or mitigate adverse human rights impacts.160 
 Integration, defined in GP 19 is the process applying the 
results of due diligence, including impact assessments, 
consultations, and expert inputs to the actual operations of the 
business enterprise. GP 19 calls for “appropriate action” 
regarding budget allocations, decision making processes and 
oversight processes.161 As to be expected, the parameters of this 
process are defined by context, including the leverage that the 
business enterprise can wield.162 
 Integration is only effective if the policy commitment has 
been fully embedded in the business enterprise’s operations.163 
In this way, the reflexive nature of the R2R Framework is clearly 
visible. Due diligence results in a policy commitment that calls 
                                                 
157 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 29. 
158 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 19. The Guiding Principles 
emphasize prevention of human rights impacts as the result of due diligence, 
leaving mitigation to the remediation sphere. However, in certain rights 
context, including indigenous rights, this emphasis may be misguided. When 
the adversely impacted rights are procedural, mitigation may be possible 
through the “appropriate action” described. 
159 Id. ¶ 19(b). 
160 Id. ¶ 19-20. 
161 Id. ¶ 19. 
162 Id. ¶ 19.a.ii. 
163 Id. ¶ 21. 
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for due diligence that in turn leads to the integration of certain 
procedures, which in turn draws on the policy commitment.164 
 Accepting the inherent vagueness in establishing human 
rights due diligence standards, the Guiding Principles attempt to 
strengthen these standards by requiring the tracking the 
effectiveness of corporate response to potential and actual 
adverse human rights impacts, as detailed in GP 20.165  Based on 
the principle of “what gets measured gets managed,” the tracking 
process should be comprehensive and transparent.166 
 GP 21 addresses the need to develop tracking process with 
external stakeholders as part of the policy commitment. This is 
for two reasons: increasing accountability and facilitating 
communication with those potentially affected, in order to 
improve performance.  As noted in the Interpretive Guide, 
“human rights due diligence is about people.”167 Therefore, 
tracking and external communication should be centered on 
actual communication and dialogue, not on merely making 




 The GPs also recognize the need for remediation procedures 
when adverse human rights do occur, which is the fourth element 
of the R2R process. GP 22 highlights the responsibility to 
provide or contribute to adequate and legitimate remediation 
processes.168 GP 29 identifies the value of independent grievance 
mechanisms that are made available outside of more formal 
court proceedings, providing adequate remedies when 
appropriate.169 GP 31 lays out in great detail how such grievance 
mechanisms should function.170 These specific remediation 
processes, while of crucial importance to the Responsibility to 
                                                 
164 See Figure 1 above. 
165 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 20. 
166 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 9. 
167 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 
106, at 33. 
168 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 22. 
169 Id. ¶ 29. 
170 Id. ¶ 31. 
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Respect framework, reach a level of technical specificity that is 
beyond the scope of the question at hand. 
 
III. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE IN GREENLAND 
 
A. Initial Due Diligence 
 
 In Part III, the framework detailed in Part II is applied to the 
specific question of indigenous rights protection in Greenland. 
By walking through the framework, step-by-step, it is possible to 
identify the specific rights-based issues faced by extractive 
industries entering the Greenlandic market. As described above, 
the first step in conducting due diligence for extractive industry 
business enterprises in Greenland is to define the four parameters 
of the corporate responsibility to respect, as identified below. 
 
1. What rights should be respected? Understanding 
the Scope of the R2R Framework 
 
 This paper deliberately focuses on the issue of indigenous 
rights. However, for the R2R Framework to be applicable in this 
case, it is necessary to ensure that these rights do fall within the 
parameters of the R2R Framework. The expansive understanding 
of rights within the R2R Framework does in fact allow for the 
possibility of including indigenous rights within the definition of 
human rights under the Framework. 
 The definition includes the following: “[d]epending on the 
circumstances of their operations, enterprises may need to 
consider additional standards beyond the International Bill of 
Human Rights and core ILO conventions, in order to ensure that 
they act with respect for human rights.”171 This is to include 
cases when corporate activities “could pose a risk to the human 
rights of individuals belonging to specific groups or populations 
that require special attention.”172  
 Indigenous groups certainly fall into that definition. The 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights identifies 
ILO 169 specifically as one of the Conventions that would be 
                                                 
171 Id. ¶ 11. 
172 Id. 
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applicable in “certain circumstances.”173 This conclusion is 
drawn from the Commentary to GP 12, which states that other 
human rights instruments may apply on a case-by-case basis, 
including the “United Nations instruments [that] have elaborated 
further on the rights of indigenous peoples.”174  
 Furthermore, it is clear that in Greenland, corporate activities 
“could pose a risk to the human rights of individuals belonging 
to specific groups or populations that require special 
attention.”175 It is also clear that in a context where indigeneity is 
a core element of the business-human rights relationship, it 
would be necessary to refer to the additional human rights 
instruments, including ILO 169 and UNDRIP.176  
 
2. How does the responsibility change within 
different contexts? Understanding the Greenlandic 
Context 
 
 The Corporate context refers to the process of “projecting 
how the proposed activity and associated business relationships 
could have adverse human rights impacts on those identified.”177 
The Guiding Principles do not adopt any specific methodology 
for completing this assessment, but rather call for “an ongoing 
process of assessing impact that will draw on various 
sources.”178  As discussed above, context can generally be 
defined along three parameters, the circumstances of the 
enterprise, the level of risk of severe human rights impacts and 
nature and context of operations. 
 In Greenland, foreign extractive industry business 
enterprises exert significant influence.179 Although not all 
business enterprises entering the extractive market would be 
                                                 
173 Id. ¶ 12. 
174 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 14. 
175 Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106, at 
11. 
176 For an in-depth explanation on the role of the FPIC Framework and 
UNDRIP generally, see infra note 197. 
177 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 19. 
178 Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106, at 
40. 
179 Nuttall, supra note 16, at 70; see supra notes 24, 26. 
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considered large firms in an international context, relative to 
scale of the economy in Greenland, they are truly massive. 
Likewise, the potential indigenous rights impacts are severe and 
affect a broad swath of stakeholders.180 Lastly, the nature and 
context of operations raise numerous red flags for enterprises 
operating in Greenland. The relationship between business 
enterprises and the government is potentially problematic as is 
the potential of business enterprises to fundamentally restructure 
the economic and political landscape.181 Furthermore, the 
untested implications of operating in a frontier market like 
Greenland on culture and the environment are a great concern.182 
If one considers the responsibility to respect as a spectrum, the 
contextual analysis suggests extractive development in 
Greenland generates the very highest levels of corporate 
responsibility. 
 
3. How responsible is a business enterprise for direct 
and indirect adverse human rights impacts caused 
by other parties? Understanding the Extent of 
Responsibility. 
 
 The realities of extractive industry development in 
Greenland suggest that although the concepts of Sphere of 
Influence and Complicity are relevant, they take on a slightly 
different meaning. In Greenland, the primary partner for 
extractive industries is the government itself. While several local 
consulting firms have sprung up to service extractive industry, 
and more supporting business are sure to arise, private enterprise 
in Greenland does not currently have the capacity to be a 
significant partner in extractive industry development.183 
Therefore, Complicity and Sphere of Influence can, and in this 
                                                 
180 See generally Part I. 
181 See supra note 97. 
182 See supra note 36. 
183 See Nuttall, supra note 16, at 68; CIA World Factbook, supra note 24; 
see generally Annex: Programming Document for the Sustainable Development 
of Greenland, ch. 2 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/ 
octs_and_greenland/documents/pdsd_and_annexes_greenland_en.pdf. 
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case should be understood in terms of public private-public 
partnerships.184  
 From this conclusion, it is only a small step to recognize that 
in primarily public economies, the responsibility of business 
enterprises for their complicity in government action is worth 
consideration. Furthermore, the failure of a business enterprise to 
exert leverage on public “partners” within their sphere of 
influence should be recognized as a failure under the 
Responsibility to Respect Framework and the Guiding 
Principles.  
 Under ILO 169, it is in fact a government responsibility to 
ensure both procedural and substantive rights for indigenous 
populations. When the government has failed to ensure 
procedural rights or substantive rights, the concepts of 
Complicity and Sphere of Influence suggest that the corporation 
may in fact be, to the extent possible, responsible for ensuring 
these rights.  
 In the context of indigenous rights, this conclusion is 
significantly strengthened. The Special Representative surveyed 
allegations of the worst cases of corporate-related human rights 
harm in a 2006 report, and determined that such harms occurred 
“predictably where governance challenges were greatest.”185 
This conclusion suggests that the shortcomings of the 
Greenlandic government in regards to protecting indigenous 
rights within the extractive industry context point to a real need 
for corporate responsibility to respect indigenous rights.  
 Admittedly, this claim lies slightly outside the general 
discourse surrounding the Framework and Guiding Principles. 
However, in the case of Greenland, this responsibility is a logical 
                                                 
184 Ruggie, supra note 103, at 6. While this understanding of these 
provisions does not appear to be an understanding intended by the Special 
Representative Ruggie, there are indications that this understanding is not 
outside of the meaning and purpose of the Framework. First off, the Framework 
conducted a 2006 survey of allegations of human rights abuses and explicitly 
recognized that “the worst cases of corporate-related human rights harm . . . 
occurred predictably where governance challenges were greatest.” Id. The 
Framework also recognizes that the primary driver of human rights abuses in 
the corporate context is the institutional misalignment between business and 
governance in regards to respecting and protecting human rights. Id. 
185 Id. 
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conclusion in regards to preventing and mitigating adverse 
indigenous rights impacts.  
 The irony of this conclusion is that the Government of 
Greenland, through the BMP, has promoted the close 
cooperation with the government as a major incentive for 
investment.186 However, the Framework suggests the relative 
failure of the government to ensure procedural and substantive 
indigenous rights may in fact shift significant responsibility and 
risk to the business enterprises themselves.  
 
B. Due Diligence: Identifying Rights at Risk 
 
 The 2013 Election provides a useful jumping off point for 
the due diligence process, already having identified the three key 
indigenous rights concerns in Greenland. Given that these 
concerns parallel exactly the requirements of ILO Convention 
169, the due diligence process can focus on these rights, 
specifically:  
 
1) Lack of opportunities for meaningful Indigenous 
Consultation and Participation in the extractives regulatory 
process; (The Right to Consultation and Participation); 
 
2) The growing impression that Greenland’s natural 
resources were being exploited and privatized for the benefit 
of foreign investors, and (The Right to Land and Natural 
Resources) 
 
3) The lack of a clear, inclusive and democratically 
determined development plan for Greenland. (The Right to 
Exercise Control Over Development).187  
                                                 
186 Interview with Ole Kjaer, Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, in Nuuk 
(Aug. 20, 2012). 
187 ILO 169, supra, note 10. At its core, ILO 169 burdens governments 
with the responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples 
concerned, “co-ordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.” Id. at 385-
86. This includes guaranteeing an equality of treatment and opportunities in 
regards to non-indigenous peoples and requires governments to “promot[e] the 
full realisation of the social, economic and cultural rights of these peoples with 




1. The Right to Consultation and Participation 
 
 The Right to Consultation and Participation lies at the very 
foundation of ILO 169 and, in practice, is the primary 
mechanism for guaranteeing the other rights.188 This requirement 
should be understood within the framework of “coordinated and 
systematic action to implement indigenous peoples’ rights.”189  
 
i. Legal Basis 
 
 This consultation requirement has perhaps become the single 
most influential part of ILO 169 and appears to have been a 
cornerstone principle for Greenland’s Mineral Resources Act of 
2009.190 Furthermore, Article Fifteen regarding indigenous rights 
to natural resources is clearly a procedural right and not a 
substantive right to ownership.191 As such, it can be concluded 
that procedural rights that are most relevant to extractive 
industry business enterprises are within the context of indigenous 
rights protection. This is in marked contrast to the Right to 
Consultation and Participation as it appears in numerous forms 
in the Convention, but it is based in Article Six, which calls on 
Governments to:  
                                                                                                 
respect for their social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions and 
their institutions.” Id. at 386. The Convention goes on to elucidate the specific 
nature of the rights to be protected as well as the process by which such 
protection is to occur. Id. 
188 INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN 
PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, at 59 (2009). As the ILO 
itself puts plainly, “Articles 6 and 7 on consultation and participation are key 
provisions of Convention No. 169 and the ‘basis for applying all the others.’” 
Id. 
189 Id. 
190 The Mineral Resources Act also applies to hydrocarbons and there is 
not a separate act of hydrocarbon regulation. The Mineral Resources Act (Act 
No. 7/2009). 
191 ILO-169, supra note 10, at 389.  Article 15 points exclusively to 
procedural rights. Id. “These rights include the right of these peoples to 
participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources.” Id. 
And “governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they 
shall consult these peoples . . . .” as well as “[t]he peoples concerned shall 
wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities.” Id. 




(a) Consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate 
procedures and in particular through their representative 
institutions, whenever consideration is being given to 
legislative or administrative measures which may affect 
them directly; and 
 
(b) Establish means by which these peoples can freely 
participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of the 
population, at all levels of decision-making in elective 
institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible 
for policies and programmes which concern them. 
 
The latter further states that: 
 
1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their 
own priorities for the process of development as it affects 
their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and 
the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise 
control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, 
social and cultural development.192 
 
In regards to extractive industry development, the 
consultation process is absolutely central to the relationship with 
indigenous communities.  “[R]elevant ILO institutions have 
emphasized that, when . . . natural resource development 
activities . . . may affect indigenous communities, a process of 
consultation with the communities, prior to commencement of 
the development activities, is at minimum required.”193 
Furthermore, Article 14. 3 makes clear that indigenous peoples 
may have a right to share in benefits from the development of 
state-owned resources on their lands.194  
 Article 15 summarizes the rights of indigenous peoples to 
“participate in the use, management and conservation of these 
resources.”195 This statement implies that extractive industry 
business enterprises will come into direct or indirect contact with 
                                                 
192 ILO-169, supra note 10, art. 6. 
193 S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 
(2d ed. 2004). 
194 ILO-169 supra note 10, art. 14.3. 
195 ILO-169, supra, note 10, at 389. 
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governments when engaged in exploration and extraction of 
natural resources. 
 While ILO 169 only technically requires “‘procedurally 
appropriate’” consultation and/or ‘free’ participation, the reality 
is that following the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) framework has come to define 
expectations.196  The FPIC as outlined in UNDRIP provides 
specific guidance on how consent of indigenous peoples should 
be obtained in such situations that impact them directly.197 Even 
the ILO Guide to Convention 169 refers to “‘free and informed 
consent,’” and repeatedly references the FPIC framework as 
interpreted both by the UNDRIP and the U.N. Development 
Guidelines.198  
 
ii. Potential Adverse Impacts 
 
 As a majority indigenous state and a signatory state to ILO 
169, the Right to Consultation and Participation is particularly 
complex in Greenland. At a national level, Greenland’s status as 
a majority indigenous nation should in theory allow for seamless 
integration between the democratic process and indigenous 
consultation and participation.  On the other hand, the current 
regulatory framework calls for independent consultation and 
participation as part of the licensing process.  
 
a. Democratic Consultation 
 
 The recent election makes a strong case that the independent 
consultation process failed to provide an adequate voice for all 
Greenlanders, who then felt compelled to make themselves heard 
at the ballot box. However, this breakdown was easily 
predictable. The informal consultation process encompasses 
                                                 
196 See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 188, at 59-79 (discussing 
participation, consultation, consent, and the ILO 169 Convention). 
197 See U. N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, pmbl., arts. 15, 17, 30, 36, 38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 
2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 
198 INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 188, at 61, 63-64. 
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three informal mechanisms: interaction with the regulatory body, 
public consultations as required under the Minerals and 
Petroleum Act, and public debate.199 In fact not one of these 
processes provided sufficient participation and consultation for 
indigenous Greenlanders to impact the decision-making process, 
as required by ILO 169 Article 6.  
 
b. The Government of Greenland 
 
In regards to extractive industry, the Government of Greenland is 
represented solely and exclusively by the Bureau of Minerals 
and Petroleum. With exclusive control over the project 
development process the BMP has outsized influence on the 
crucial national question of extractive industry development. As 
Parliamentarians rely on the administrative bodies for 
knowledge, especially regarding technical issues, the BMP has 
almost complete control.200 
 One of the most significant concerns raised during the 2013 
Elections was that the majority indigenous population of 
Greenland has functionally no role in BMP decision-making. 
Instead, the BMP has been largely divorced from public 
oversight in the extractives licensing process and does not ensure 
effective mechanisms for consultation.201 Operating 
independently and in close collaboration with extractive 
enterprises, the BMP is openly pursuing an agenda, which while 
                                                 
199 Author’s personal notes taken during the Public Consultation August 
27, 2012; Interview with by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Consulting Professionals, in Green. (Aug. 23, 2012).200 See Interview by 
Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative, in 
Green. (Aug. 21, 2012); Interview with Aqqaluk Lynge, Chair, Inuit 
Circumpolar Counsel, in Thule, Greenland (August 28, 2012); Interview by 
Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member of Parliament, in 
Green. (Aug. 26, 2012). 
200 See Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representative, in Green. (Aug. 21, 2012); Interview with Aqqaluk 
Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Counsel, in Thule, Greenland (August 28, 
2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member of 
Parliament, in Green. (Aug. 26, 2012). 
201 This conclusion was drawn by from strong agreement amongst 
respondents in the civil society, business, academic and non-administrative 
government sectors. 
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not intrinsically problematic, does not reflect a consultative 
process that includes indigenous concerns. There is a strong push 
at BMP to approve extractive projects as quickly as possible, a 
push that is not being counteracted by a strong civil society, 
informed Parliament or even the media.202 As one respondent 
noted, “it’s not that they [the BMP] are evil, they just have their 
ideas on how things should happen and they implement those 
ideas.”203 
 
c. Public Consultation Process 
 
 The newly implemented consultation processes were 
implemented as part of the SIA framework and designed to 
alleviate many of the concerns later manifested during the 2013 
Elections. Unfortunately, this process has been plagued by 
problems form the beginning.204 Largely an informal process, 
                                                 
202 See Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representative, supra note 37; Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with 
Anonymous Source, Member of Parliament, supra note 47; Interview with 
Aqqaluk Lynge, supra note 63; Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with 
Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative, in Green. (Aug. 16, 2012); 
Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Indigenous Rights 
Activist, in Green. (Aug. 15, 2012). It appears that the culture of the civil 
service in Greenland was essentially transplanted from Denmark about 30 years 
ago and, with high turnover, has not changed. 
203 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representative, supra note 37. Several respondents noted that the new 
government is a substantial improvement over the old government, which was 
becoming corrupt after 30 years in power. Id. However, the new government 
has not made significant changes to the civil service so the problems just 
discussed remain as serious as before. Id. 
204 See Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Indigenous Rights Activist, supra note 202; Interview with Aqqaluk Lynge, 
supra note 63. To provide context, following a sales pitch for the project, there 
was a consultation period of 30 minutes, but no documents were released and 
the Strategic Environmental Assessment was not released in time. Interview by 
Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative, 
supra note 37. Regarding the BMP, complaints by respondents were numerous. 
BMP staff turnover is very high and there is a limited institutional knowledge 
base. Denmark has precious little mining experience. Yet, the BMP is staffed 
primarily by young Danish lawyers, who are responsible for approving projects 
more than ten times the largest public works project ever completed in 
Denmark. Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
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contractors have used a variety of tools, including phone 
interviews, personal networks and public meetings to generate 
information on community concerns regarding the proposed 
project.205  
 The problems with the implementation of the approach 
include a general resistance by corporations to sufficiently fund 
the process, limitations on the time needed to complete the 
process, language difficulties and a lack of accessible 
information for communities, a lack of follow up and general 
consultation fatigue in effected communities.206 One MP who 
has attended meetings in the settlements noted that the 
participants just stared blankly, not understanding what was 
being talked about.207 Another concern is that the corporations 
have a great deal of control over the information, particularly 
what is generated and what is shared, which further reduces the 
consultative nature of the process.208 This should not imply that 
the process is deliberately malignant. Several respondents noted 
                                                                                                 
representative from BMP, supra note 29. The Alcoa aluminum smelter near 
Maniitsoq was the first large scale-project under the new system that directly 
impacted communities and the first consultation as well. The consultations that 
accompanied this project have been described as “stunning,” for their lack of 
content, obvious bias, and almost non-existent opportunity for consultation. A 
lack of translation excluded large numbers of ethnic Greenlanders, while 
obvious support from the government and media depicted the project as a fore-
gone conclusion. The whole experience created strong negative impressions 
and has been described as colonialist. As a result, the project remains stalled 
and the consultation process has been overhauled. Interview by Rutherford 
Hubbard with Anonymous Sources, Impact Assessment Professionals, in 
Green. (Aug. 17, 2012). 
205 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Sources, Impact 
Assessment Professionals, in Green. (Aug. 27, 2012). 
206 Id. 
207 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member 
of Parliament, supra note 47. 
208 See Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Member of Parliament, supra note 47; Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with 
Anonymous Source, Indigenous Rights Activist, supra note 203; Interview by 
Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Indigenous Rights Activist, in 
Green. (Aug. 16, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous 
Source, Indigenous Rights Activist, in Green. (Aug. 22, 2012). 
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that proper government oversight is needed yet the government 
does not have the resources to fulfill this function.209 
 The challenge of effective consultation in Greenland is 
exacerbated by the cultural approach to decision-making and 
authority. There is a great belief in authority in Greenland, no 
one wants to question authority or will believe that they are 
being misled.210 At the same time, Greenlanders like to 
internalize information and discuss it with family and close 
relations.211 It is a relationship culture, that is how they make 
decisions. It takes time and is a slow measured process. 
However, once a decision has been reached, it is final.212 As a 
result, a time-limited public consultation wherein the relevant 
corporate actor and/or BMP representative is present is the 
culturally least effective way to reach a consensus on project 
development.  
 An important complicating element is language. Greenland 
is officially bilingual, Danish and Greenlandic. However, many 
people in the settlements do not speak Danish, while corporate 
actors usually operate in English and the BMP primarily operates 
in Danish. In addition, regional dialects can require a local 
translator, well versed in the technical terminology of extractive 
industries.213  
 In an attempt to rectify some of these problems, the 
government has taken an active role in organizing public 
consultations in regards to the Isua Mining Project. As the 
affected community is Nuuk, the consultations are taking place 
there. Managed by a local contractor, the four consultations are 
attempting to establish a culturally sensitive, tri-lingual forum 
for discussing and improving the project.214 Unfortunately, in 
                                                 
209 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representative, supra note 37. 
210 Id. 
211 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Consulting Professionals, in Green. (Aug. 23, 2012). 
212 Id. 
213 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Impact 
Assessment Professionals, supra note 47. 
214 Interview with by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Consulting Professionals, in Green. (Aug. 23, 2012); The consultations include 
formal presentations, question and answer periods, informal small group 
150 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
 
practice, these consultations have exhibited many of the 
problems seen before.215 
 
d. Civil Society and Media 
 
 One specific reason for the disconnect between the BMP’s 
licensing process and the Greenlandic public has been the lack of 
a well-developed civil society and robust independent media.  In 
a healthy democratic system, a powerful administrative body like 
the BMP would be countered by a strong civil society, supported 
by free media. In the context of indigenous participation in 
governmental decision-making, a strong civil society and 
information distribution through the media is essential to 
guaranteeing indigenous participation.  
 In Greenland, free media exists, but is woefully underfunded 
because of the small market size.216 Unfortunately, the civil 
society is even weaker. There are precious few civil society 
organizations in Greenland and even the most effective ones 
suffer from limited resources and chronic shortages of staff.217 
                                                                                                 
discussions and a final public discussion. Id. Everyone who participates does so 
as a citizen, although specific invitations were made to those already involved 
in the process. Id. The consultation facilitators are not responsible for providing 
information, but are seeking to facilitate the flow of information by telling 
people where to find it for themselves. Id. The outcome of the meetings are a 
kind of condensed minutes, are submitted to BMP and also placed on the 
website. Id.  In addition, each subsequent meeting starts with a review of the 
past meetings. Ideally, this process will be incorporated into the final SIA and 
EIA, but there is no mechanism to ensure this integration. Id. Citizens and civil 
society remain responsible for holding the BMP and the Corporate actor 
responsible for applying the results of the consultations to the final project 
proposal. Id. This new consultation process is itself a test case, and it is hoped 
that the process will be successful enough to replicate throughout the country. 
Id. 
215 See id. 
216 See Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representative, in Green. (Aug. 15, 2012); Interview by Rutherford 
Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative, Civil Society 
Representative note 169; Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous 
Source, Civil Society Representative, in Green. (Aug. 22, 2012); Interview by 
Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative, in 
Green. (Aug. 27, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous 
Source, Indigenous Rights Activist, supra note 169. 
217 Id. 
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As a result, the BMP, together with extractive industry 
enterprises, have a near monopoly on information. This 
information deficit can be seen clearly in the consultation 
process which has developed as a mandatory part of the licensing 
process, as noted above.  
 
2. The Right to Land and Resources 
  
i. Legal Basis 
 
 Part II of the Convention recognizes the “special 
importance” between indigenous peoples and the lands or 
territories that they “occupy or otherwise use,” collectively.218 
When read in the context of Article Fourteen, it becomes clear 
that land rights, constructive, collective, prescriptive or 
otherwise, are the responsibility of the government.  
 The Convention goes beyond land rights to include specific 
provisions regarding natural resource management. Article 
Fifteen, creates an obligation on States to safeguard indigenous 
peoples’ right to the natural resources located on their lands. 
Importantly, Article 15 does not call for indigenous ownership 
over natural resources on their lands, but does highlight the right 
of “[indigenous] peoples to participate in the use, management 
and conservation of . . . resources.”219 Article 15 also requires a 
consultation process, to apply when ownership of the resources 
are vested in the state.220 
 In Greenland, natural resource ownership and the collection 
of revenue have serious ILO 169 implications. To begin with, 
ownership over Greenlandic natural resources is not clearly 
defined, as noted above.221 
 
ii. Potential Adverse Impacts 
 
 The BMP currently administers ownership of natural 
resources; therefore, indigenous land rights are not recognized 
                                                 
218 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 13. 
219 Id. ¶ 15.1. 
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221 See supra notes 53-55. 
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outside of democratic processes. The Danish lawyers at the BMP 
are not well educated in Greenlandic collective ownership 
principles or cultural relationships to land and resources.222 As a 
result, it can be said that Greenland falls far short of ILO 169 
requirements regarding a coordinated and systematic approach to 
indigenous land rights.  
 Therefore, two questions are raised. First, does Greenland 
recognize indigenous land rights? And second, does Greenland 
have an adequate system in place to ensure consultation and 
participation regarding the allocation of natural resources and 
benefit sharing? To the first question, the answer has to be no. 
To the second question, the consultation process does appear to 
satisfy the requirements of Convention Article 6, in form. 
However, in function the answer again is no.223  
 The recent election highlighted this relative failure in in a 
big way. Prime Minister elect Hammond has promised to 
increase indigenous participation in natural resource 
exploitation, as well as significantly increase royalty 
payments.224 She also seeks to legalize the extraction of uranium, 
and the precious rare earths with which it is intertwined.225 It 
                                                 
222 Interview with Aqqaluk Lynge, Chair, Inuit Circumpolar Counsel, in 
Thule, Greenland (August 28, 2012). 
223   1. The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own 
priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, 
institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, 
and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over their own economic, social 
and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for national and 
regional development which may affect them directly. 
2. The improvement of the conditions of life and work and levels of 
health and education of the peoples concerned, with their participation and co-
operation, shall be a matter of priority in plans for the overall economic 
development of areas they inhabit. Special projects for development of the areas 
in question shall also be so designed as to promote such improvement. 
3. Governments shall ensure that, whenever appropriate, studies are 
carried out, in co-operation with the peoples concerned, to assess the social, 
spiritual, cultural and environmental impact on them of planned development 
activities. The results of these studies shall be considered as fundamental 
criteria for the implementation of these activities. 
4. Governments shall take measures, in co-operation with the peoples 
concerned, to protect and preserve the environment of the territories they 
inhabit. 
ILO 169, supra note 10, at 387. 
224 See sources cited supra note 5. 
225 Id. 
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appears that the government was ousted, in part, because of the 
general failure to address these issues of extraction and royalties, 
as required by ILO 169. 
 
 
3. The Right to Exercise Control Over Development  
 
i. Legal Basis 
 
 The ILO 169 Right to Exercise Control over Development is 
found in Article 7. It reserves for indigenous persons “the right 
to decide their own priorities for the process of development.” 
including in regards to the preservation of the “environment and 
territories they inhabit.”226 ILO 169 also calls on governments to 
ensure that studies are carried out, in co-operation with the 
peoples concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and 
environmental impact on them of planned development 
activities.227 
 There is a close link between the Right to Exercise Control 
over Development and the Right Consultation and Participation. 
While it could easily be said that the latter supports the integrity 
of the former, this is perhaps too simplistic. Rather, the Right 
Exercise Control over Development is perhaps better understood 
as a specific manifestation of the Right to Consultation and 
Participation, which the ILO highlights because of its specific 
importance. 
 
ii. Potential Adverse Impacts 
 
 The failure to establish an effective development plan for 
Greenland that included all relevant stakeholders and specifically 
recognized the concerns of indigenous people was a key issue in 
the March election.  Prime Minister-elect Hammond herself 
emphasized that “‘Greenland should work with countries that 
have the same values as we have, on how human rights should 
be respected. We are not giving up our values for investors' 
                                                 
226 Guiding Principles, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.4. 
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sake.’"228 This deliberate reference to international human rights 
is important. So too is the concept of equitable and participatory 
development. On this subject, Ms. Hammond’s words echo ILO 
169 Article 7:  “‘[d]evelopment must be fair to all Greenlanders . 
. . both those in villages and those in cities.’” 229  
 Prime Minister-elect Hammond’s views were generally 
expressed by interviewees a full seven months before the 
election.230 Even the BMP has noted that potential licensees 
should by law present alternative development plans and, in an 
ideal world, would present non-extractive development 
alternatives, as unlikely as this is.231  
 Greenland is changing rapidly, and given its fragile 
environment, unique culture and reliance on natural resources, 
this change appears to many to be running out of control. What 
is clear is that the current extractive industry development 
strategy does not have a substantial indigenous element, nor has 
it been subject to public scrutiny. In the rush for economic 
strength and the political independence that it buys, Greenland is 
proceeding with extractive industry development before 
addressing the more fundamental question of what kind of socio-
political-economic state Greenland wants to be. As the Director 
of the ICC puts it, “[w]ould you take the people hostage just to 
gain independence? What kind of independence will you get?”232 
 In terms of indigenous rights, this means that decisions are 
being made now, that may impact the possibility of protecting 
                                                 
228 Macalister, supra note 5 (quoting Siumut Party chief Aleqa 
Hammond). 
229 Ghosh, supra note 5 (quoting Siumut Party chief Aleqa Hammond). 
230 In August of 2012, the author travelled to Greenland to conduct the 
research that resulted in this paper. Applying the R2R Framework and Guiding 
Principles as a framework for research, the conclusion was drawn that 
indigenous rights concerns were undermining extractive industry in Greenland 
and had the potential to destabilize the entire industry. These findings were 
shared with at the Michigan State University Law School Symposium, “The 
Battle for the Far North” less than three weeks before Greenland Parliamentary 
Election. That this prediction was proved correct, and far more quickly than 
anticipated, is a powerful argument for the effectiveness of the U.N. 
Framework. 
231 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Representative of BMP, in Green. (Aug. 20, 2012). 
232 Interview with Aqqaluk Lynge supra note 63. 
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indigenous rights in the future. Extractive industry development 
is a trade-off and one that, according to several respondents, 
Greenlanders are willing to accept, provided that they have some 
say in what it looks like. 
 The barriers to establishing a real vision that accounts for 
indigenous rights in Greenland faces several hurdles. The 
obvious ones are resources, the lack of an effective political 
opposition, and a lack of competency within both the 
government and civil society to undertake such a unique and 
challenging initiative.233 The more complex challenges include 
cultural barriers to large-scale decision-making, general 
education levels, and a strong understanding of Greenland’s 
potential place in the world.234 
 Some have called on the Premier of Greenland to organize a 
national dialogue on development and values.235 This may be a 
much more achievable goal now that political change has 
occurred. Others hope that the civil society will fulfill this role, 
although it currently does not have the resources or 
competencies to do so. While the consultation process is moving 
in a positive direction and indigenous rights are getting an ever 
larger hearing in regards to mega-project development, there has 
yet to be indigenous input on the choice to pursue mega-projects 
in the first place.236 As Aqqaluk Lynge noted, “[t]he Inuit of 
Greenland survived 5000 years as a people, but [mega-projects] 
could destroy that culture.”237 
 
IV.TOWARDS A POLICY COMMITMENT AND STEPS FORWARD 
 
                                                 
233 Id.; Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
Society Representative (Aug. 21, 2012) see supra note 37. 
Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Consultation 
Consulting Professionals (Aug. 23, 2012). 
234 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member 
of Parliament (Aug. 26, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with 
Anonymous Source, Impact Assessment Professionals (Aug.27, 2012). 
235 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Civil 
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Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Consultation 
Consulting Professionals (Aug. 23, 2012). 
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A. Why Due Diligence? 
 
 The 2013 Parliamentary Elections in Greenland served as a 
clear and unequivocal warning to extractive industry enterprises. 
Indigenous rights risk had become direct and measurable harm to 
business enterprises in Greenland. While this should be a 
sufficient reason to embrace a rights-based approach to 
Greenlandic operations, it must be recognized that business 
enterprises will remain unwilling to do so, as there are currently 
no direct legal ramifications for failure to abide by the R2R 
Framework or Guiding Principles.238 Furthermore, unlike human 
rights violations of physical integrity defined under the 
International Bill of Rights or violations of labor rights defined 
under the 8 Core Conventions of the ILO, violations of 
indigenous rights under ILO 169 are unlikely to fall under 
domestic or international criminal legislation.239 There are 
however four key reasons that enterprises should seek to achieve 
human rights compliance.  
 First, the Guiding Principles are likely to affect the 
development of laws and regulatory frameworks that will 
directly impact business enterprises in the future.240 This danger 
has already been realized in Greenland.241 
 Second, banks, institutional investors, and counter-parties 
are increasingly demanding human rights compliance.242 
Extractive industries require substantial investments and NGOs 
have successfully targeted banks and other institutional investors 
                                                 
238 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, Introduction. 
239 Contribution of the United Nations, supra note 103, at 13. The 
Guiding Principles make clear that the responsibility to respect is absolute and 
independent of legal compliance with domestic or international law. Id. 
240 Bonnitcha, supra note 108, at 15. 
241 Rutherford Hubbard, Risk, Rights and Responsibility: Navigating 
Corporate Responsibility and Indigenous Rights in Greenlandic Extractive 
Industry Development (Feb. 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript). For purposes 
of perspective, the original statement in this paper as drafter prior to the March 
Elections read, “[i]n Greenland, where extractive industry regulation comes up 
for debate at each new sitting of the Parliament, this is a substantial risk if a 
long-term investment is being considered.” Id. 
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regarding extractive industry investments in several countries.243 
As indigenous rights become a higher profile issue 
internationally, this risk increases significantly. 
 Third is the issue of reputational risk.244 Considering the 
attention generated by Greenland’s strong democratic statement 
on extractive development and indigenous rights, reputational 
risk is a serious concern indeed.245 This risk is compounded by 
the strength of international indigenous networks of which some 
Greenlanders are a part.246  
 Lastly, protecting human rights is the generally accepted 
“‘right thing to do.’”247 While this argument may not always 
carry much water in comparison to the bottom line, Greenland’s 
unique indigenous culture and unique environmental landscape 
certainly raise profound moral arguments against the abuse of 
human rights in Greenland. 
 
B. Why a Policy Commitment? 
 
 Following the completion of Initial Due Diligence, the next 
step in applying the R2R Framework and Guiding Principles is 
to develop a policy commitment. The nature and scope of the 
Policy Commitment will depend on the likelihood that the 
business enterprises’ activities will generate severe adverse 
impacts. In Greenland, it has already been made clear that these 
impacts are real, and are being felt by the local indigenous 
population. 
 The paper has further argued that the weak regulatory 
framework for protecting certain indigenous rights in Greenland 
is likely to be changed and therefore extractive business 
enterprises may seek to be involved in that process either 
                                                 
243 See generally Rebecca Lawrence, Hidden Hands in the Market: 
Ethnographies of Fair Trade, Ethical Consumption, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 28 RES. ECON. ANTHROPOLOGY 241 (2008). 
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246 See, e.g., INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR CONF., http://www.inuitcircumpolar. 
com (last visited Sept. 9, 2013); TRANSPARENCY GREEN., 
http://www.transparency.gl/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2013); UNIV. ARCTIC, 
http://www.uarctic.org (last visited Sept. 9, 2013). 
247 Bonnitcha, supra note 108. 
158 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22:1 
 
 
directly, or by demonstrating best practices independently. In 
this context, the Policy Commitment is a crucial tool in 
minimizing risk, reducing current and potential regulatory 
burdens, and ensuring long-term business viability.   
 The Guiding Principles emphasize that corporate Policy 
Commitment should be based on the salience of the impacted 
rights.248 Salience of impacted rights is determined by two 
parameters, the severity/ probability of the impact occurring, and 
the corporate relationship to the adverse impact (the context), on 
the other.249   
 Business enterprises should consider the size of the impact, 
the number of people impacted both immediately and in the 
future, and the possibility of effective redress.  In the indigenous 
rights context, irremediability is of particular relevance, as 
cultural and environmental impacts are often permanent and may 
not be adequately addressed though financial compensation.250 
 Salient and severe human rights risks have already 
manifested themselves in Greenland. The resulting political 
changes have already created tangible economic impacts for 
extractive industry enterprises.  This final part of the paper offers 
ways forward for extractive industry business enterprises in the 
face of this growing opposition and increased emphasis on 
indigenous rights in Greenland.   
 The problems identified by this research, as well as the 
dynamic emerging political realities of Greenland indicate that 
                                                 
248 Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 106, at 
8. “The Guiding Principles make clear that an enterprise should not focus 
exclusively on the most salient human rights issues and ignore others that might 
arise. But the most salient rights will logically be the ones on which it 
concentrates its primary efforts.” Id. 
249 See Guiding Principles, supra note 11, Key Concepts. 
250 See id. Presentation on Business and Human Rights at U.N. Office of 
the High Commissioner of Human Rights in Phnom Penh (Jan. 24, 2013) 
(discussing the differences between CSR and human rights compliance, noting 
that human rights compliance is less likely to be remediable through financial 
compensation). Also, the Alta Hydropower Project in Alta Norway as well as 
the case of the Thule Cases originating in Northwestern Greenland. To 
paraphrase the words of Aqqalaq Lynge, the current president of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference and expert on the Thule cases, “[s]how me one 
country where extractive industries have not destroyed the local indigenous 
culture.” Interview with Aqqaluk Lynge , supra note 63. 
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business entities seeking to operate in Greenland will have to 
take independent steps to ensure indigenous rights compliance, 
but also work with the Government of Greenland to establish a 
rights friendly environment. Therefore, these recommendations 
have been divided into two categories: Unilateral Initiatives and 
Collaborative Initiatives, which include the Government of 
Greenland as well as other relevant stakeholders.  
 
C. Specific Recommendations 
 
1. Unilateral Initiatives 
 
 At the very minimum, the informal consultation process as 
required under Greenlandic Law, must be improved in practice. 
Individual business enterprises can take the lead in this area by 
designing consultations for their projects to exceed the existing 
legal framework. This can be accomplished by focusing on four 
parameters of the consultation process; access to information, 
language of interaction, incorporation of cultural norms and 
extended consultation periods.251  
 The first area of improvement is access to information. 
Relevant information should be prepared in an easily accessible 
format that can be read an understood by a non-expert. The kind 
of detailed technical information that has been released for 
previous consultations does have a role to play in the 
consultation process, but it greatly reduces accessibility to the 
consultation process.252 Information sharing should also take 
place in a timely fashion. While improvements have been made 
over the past two years, even recent consultation process, have 
not provided sufficient time to review available information prior 
to the consultation.253 
                                                 
251 See generally supra Part II.B. 
252 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Member 
of Parliament (Aug. 26, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with 
Anonymous Source, Civil Society Representative (Aug. 16, 2012); Interview 
by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Indigenous Rights Activist 
(Aug. 15, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Civil Society Representative (Aug. 21, 2012). 
253 Id. 
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 Second is the issue of language. The language of discourse 
in a bilingual society is always a challenge. While efforts have 
been made to meet this challenge, further issues are raised 
regarding local dialects and technical terminology.254 Increased 
effort must be paid to ensure that consultations are conducted in 
such a way as not to exclude stakeholders by means of language.  
 Third, it is necessary to ensure that consultations reflect 
cultural norms of decision-making. While some efforts have 
been made in this direction recently, they remain far from 
sufficient.255 Culturally, Greenlanders prefer a longer decision 
making process that highlights dialogue and consensus. 
However, decisions reached in this manner are binding.256 
Business enterprises should take advantage of the sustainability 
created by adopting culturally sensitive consultation processes. 
 Fourth, engaging in consultation earlier in the project 
development process will allow for meaningful participation as 
required by ILO 169.257 Consultations implemented in Greenland 
up to now appear to have already accepted the inevitability of the 
proposed project, with the consultation merely serving to 
potentially modify minor details of the project.258 This process is 
in fact not a consultation at all and does not satisfy ILO 169’s 
consultation and participation requirements.  
 In order to improve the indigenous land and resource rights 
protections in Greenland, business enterprises should seek to 
conduct careful due diligence on historical land use, usufruct 
rights and potential environmental impacts on surrounding 
lands.259 Greenland is a vast landmass, but it is not always 
                                                 
254 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, Impact 
Assessment Professionals (Aug. 27, 2012); Interview by Rutherford Hubbard 
with Anonymous Source, Consulting Professionals (Aug. 23, 2012). 
255 See generally supra Part II.B. 
256 Interview by Rutherford Hubbard with Anonymous Source, 
Consulting Professionals (Aug. 23, 2012). 
257 ILO 169, supra note 10, at 386-87. 
258 See supra note 79. 
259 See generally Christina Allard, The Nordic Countries’ Law on Sámi 
Territorial Rights, 2 ARCTIC REV. L. & POL.,159 (2011); Elina Helander, The 
Nature of Sami Customary Law, in ARCTIC GOVERNANCE (JURIDICA 
LAPPONICA) 29, 88-96, (Timo Koivurova et al. eds., 2004) (referencing 
interesting discussions on traditional land use rights in the arctic); Birger 
Poppel, Subsistence Activities in the Arctic, in CULTURAL AND SOCIAL 
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apparent which specific areas may have significant resource, 
cultural or religious value to surrounding communities. A good 
faith effort to avoid operations in such lands should reduce the 
potential risk of lawsuits and negative publicity.  
 Furthermore, extractive industries have environmental 
impacts. In the Arctic these environmental impacts are greatly 
magnified, both by the fragility of the ecosystem and on the 
extent to which indigenous peoples depend on that ecosystem. 
Given the current lack of clarity regarding land and resource 
ownership, environmental impacts may have significant long-
term consequences. GP 24 recognizes the need to identify the 
most serious and/or irredeemable impacts and address them first. 
 Therefore, special attention must be paid to understanding, 
isolating and minimizing environmental degradation. This may 
mean choosing sustainable energy sources to limit infrastructure, 
as has been suggested in Greenland.260 It is also important to 
consider the location of projects, gaining a careful understanding 
of migration and breeding habits, as well as indigenous land 
claims before proceeding. While the Arctic may appear to be a 
vast wasteland to some, the careful placement of extractive 
infrastructure may significantly lessen the overall impact on 
indigenous rights. 
 The Right to Exercise Control over Development can be 
significantly strengthened by improved reporting procedures. 
Greenlandic law lacks the requirement, or even the mention of 
the reporting of human rights impacts. Such reporting improves 
the overall understanding of extractive industries, strengthens 
ties with civil society and demonstrates corporate commitment to 
indigenous rights. Voluntary or mandatory reporting should be 
done in coordination with other business enterprises and with 
civil society groups. This kind of peer monitoring process has 
been applied with some success in regards to the U.N. 
Convention against Corruption and in the CSR field.261 Despite 
                                                                                                 
RESEARCH IN GREENLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1992-2010  (Karen Langgård  
ed., Univ. of Green., 2011) (referencing discussions pertaining to Greenlandic 
traditional land usage patterns). 
260 Author’s personal notes taken during the Public Consultation August 
27, 2012. 
261 On Common Ground Consultants, Inc., From Theory to Practice: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Development in Mineral 
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the lack of a legal requirement, business enterprises operating in 
Greenland should seek to actively report on their adverse and 
positive impacts in Greenland.  
 The relatively small size of Greenlandic society really 
facilitates effective communication and supports the 
recommendation of increasing information availability. As 
Greenland is still in the beginning of large-scale extractive 
development, effective reporting on projects will facilitate an 
improved regulatory structure and stronger community-corporate 
relationships in the long term. 
 
2. Collaborative Initiatives 
 
 Meaningful consultation processes require that stakeholders 
are “informed.”262 The research for this paper found a recurring 
and significant lack of accurate, non-partisan knowledge that 
draws on both scientific and indigenous sources. In terms of 
cost-benefit analysis, there is perhaps no one thing that extractive 
industry business enterprises can do that would be of greater 
benefit than funding extensive knowledge generation and 
dissemination projects. However, it is not possible for a single 
business enterprise to achieve this goal independently.  
 Increased factual understandings of the ecosystems and 
societies of the Arctic, effectively distributed to communities, 
government agents and corporate actors greatly strengthens the 
consultation process, limits rights violations, improves 
community relations, increases project stability, and facilitates 
compliance with the U.N. Guiding Principles overall.263 
 At the most basic level, business enterprises should also 
pursue basic background training regarding the environment and 
culture of the country. Greenland is an exciting frontier for 
extractive industries and a willing partner in extractive industry 
                                                                                                 
Exploration, (Mar. 2-3, 2007), http://www.pdac.ca/docs/default-source/public-
affairs/csr-course-report.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 
262 See supra notes 197-98. 
263 See generally supra Part I. The Impact Assessment Process and the 
Impact Benefit Agreements are largely driven by the investing entity and only 
require limited governmental oversight and approval. These are just two more 
formalized examples of the potential direct role that can be played by business 
entities themselves in regards to community engagement. Id. 
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development. Yet, many Greenlandic respondents expressed 
disappointment in how little their corporate partners knew about 
the country. Even a cursory understanding of the country, its 
culture, politics, and environment, would greatly strengthen 
rights protection and improve relations between business 
enterprises and local partners. 
 As a majority indigenous state with a primarily publicly 
owned economy, Greenland finds itself in unusual position. 
Public private partnerships could be an engine for indigenous 
control over development, but the reality has been quite 
different. Although extractive business enterprises in Greenland 
have little say over the relationship between the government and 
its citizens, they do have a control over how they interact with 
communities directly affected by economic development.264 
Failure to respect this right could potentially undermine the 
Greenland’s indigenous community, effectively denying them of 
a role in shaping their own economy and consequently, socio-
political system. 
 In order to ensure fundamental respect for the indigenous 
right to land and natural resources, as well as mitigate corporate 
risk, it will be necessary to resolve questions of land and 
resources rights, the sooner the better. It is therefore strongly 
encouraged that business enterprises apply their leverage to 
advocate for a clarification of land rights in Greenland. This is 
simply good sense as such clarification is inevitable and the later 
it is completed, the greater risk of land seizure, damages, or 
operational restrictions.265 ILO Convention 169 is very clear on 
the procedural requirements for clarifying land rights and these 
procedures should be carefully followed.266  
                                                 
264 As noted in Part I, the Impact Assessment Process and the Impact 
Benefit Agreements are largely driven by the investing entity and only require 
limited governmental oversight and approval. These are just two more 
formalized examples of the potential direct role that can be played by business 
entities themselves in regards to community engagement. Id. 
265 Interview with Aqqalaq Lynge, President, Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(Aug. 27, 2012) (noting that the potential for lawsuits in the near future is very 
high); see also (Hingitaq 53 and Others v. Denmark, 2006-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 345) 
(highlighting Greenlanders past experiences before the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council). 
266 ILO 169, supra note 10, at 388-89. 
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 One specific and immediate area where Government and 
business enterprises could improve the land and resource rights 
framework is in regards to IBAs. The current system relies on 
the BMP to initiate the monitoring and renegotiation of IBAs.267 
It would both strengthen corporate compliance and improve 
corporate-community relations if an annual impact and benefit 
audit were prepared that recognizes concerns, but also publishes 
the benefits of extractive industry development. 
 By engaging directly with communities through the IBA 
process, it would be possible for business enterprises to become 
actual partners with affected stakeholders in the extractive 
development process. This would significantly minimize risk in 
the area of the right to exercise control over development as well 
as improving consultation and participation and potentially 
reduce the risks associated with land and resource rights. 
 Meaningful protection of the Right to Exercise Control Over 
Development in Greenland is impossible until a comprehensive 
development plan for Greenland, which incorporates the 
perspective of all Greenlanders, has been established. Until this 
time, it has not been possible to state the indigenous right to 
exercise control over development has been satisfied. An 
overwhelming number of respondents noted that until a 
development vision for Greenland is established, any extractive 
industry project has potential adverse impacts on indigenous 
rights. This lack of vision essentially denies the efficacy of the 
consultation and participation process and precludes corporate 
attempts to respect indigenous rights in a meaningful way. 
 Specifically, the creation of a fund to work towards a 
comprehensive extractive industry development plan for 
Greenland may be advisable. Such an initiative would carry its 
own risk, however, potentially narrowing the space for extracting 
industry development. 
 This final recommendation therefore presents business 
enterprises with a balance of risks. Pushing forward now is 
almost certain to result in rights violations and potential 
economic, political, reputational, and legal risk. On the other 
hand, active engagement in improving the rights environment 
                                                 
267 Interview with Ole Kjaer, Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, in Nuuk 
(Aug. 20, 2012). 
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may potentially reduce operation space for extractive industry 
business enterprises. However, in consideration of the U.N. 
Guiding Principles, it appears that the balance is shifting in favor 




 In closing, this paper has first demonstrated that the 
substantial political risk generated during Greenland’s 2013 
Parliamentary Election was a direct result of insufficient 
indigenous rights protection in Greenland. Second, it has 
identified the ways in which the Responsibility to Respect 
Framework and corresponding U.N. Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights can and should be used to identify 
and analyze these specific areas of indigenous rights risk. Lastly, 
this paper has used the Framework to recommend specific 
independent and collaborative initiatives, which can help 
business enterprises, navigate the dynamic and challenging new 
reality of extractives development and rights protection in 
Greenland.  
 Greenland is home to a unique arctic environment, fostering 
a unique indigenous culture. Extractive industries have the 
potential to preserve both, while raising socio-economic levels 
and demonstrating that cultural and environmentally sustainable 
development is a real possibility for indigenous peoples. At the 
same time, recent history and international experience suggest 
that Greenland runs a very substantial risk of environmental, 
social, and cultural catastrophe.  
 The uncomfortable reality highlighted by the March 
Elections, is that extractive industry development in Greenland 
needs to slow down. This is not to say that there should be a 
moratorium on extractive industry development, but it does 
indicate that certain protections of fundamental indigenous rights 
must be in place before large-scale projects should move 
forward.  
 As Greenland’s new government changes the regulatory 
framework for extractive industry, there is a great opportunity. 
Greenland is positioned to be a leader in sustainable, human 
rights friendly extractive development, but it will require 
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collaboration of the Government, civil society, and business 
enterprises to realize this vision. It is hoped therefore that this 
paper will contribute to a much larger debate on the role of 
extractive development in Greenland and assist business 
enterprises in making a positive contribution to Greenland’s 
development.  
 
